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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The emphasis of this paper is on commercial food aid; emergency aid is dealt with as it affects
food markets.  Principal conclusions of the study are:
- Food aid shipments of maize to Mozambique increased sharply in 1992 and 1993,
totalling over a half a million tons each year.  Since its inception, the food aid program
has saved many thousands if not millions of lives.  Significant volumes of aid will
continue to be necessary for some years to come, yet the fundamental conditions in the
country have changed, and the food aid program must change with them.  Properly
managed, food aid can contribute to the transition to a robust private production and
marketing economy.  Improperly managed, food aid may derail or significantly slow
the process.  
- Prior to late 1992, commercial food aid quantities typically did not meet demand at the
very low prices that were charged to consignees.  As a result, consignees earned
sometimes very sizeable excess profits.  During this time, fluctuating food aid volumes
and uncertain timing of arrivals greatly contributed to retail price instability.  Prices
charged to consignees had little if any effect on retail prices.  Since late 1992, leakage
of emergency grain onto markets has combined with very large commercial shipments
to drastically reduce prices.  As a result, many consignees have certainly lost large
amounts of money over the past months.  It remains unclear whether the leakage of
emergency grain onto markets is under control.
- Evidence indicates that continued large volumes of yellow maize food aid sold at low
prices will create disincentives to the production and marketing of domestic white
maize.  Due to the current oversupply, a rapid increase in consignee price at this time
would likely cause a drastic reduction in consignee demand.  The current retail price is
approximately half of IPP, but is similar in real terms to market prices from mid 1991
through mid 1992.  Import parity prices in Mozambique would be far lower than peak
prices that have occurred during times of scarcity.  Prices in Swaziland present no
barrier to import parity pricing of maize in Mozambique.  
- Stabilizing dollar prices results in very little metical price stabilization, due to the
unstable metical/dollar exchange rate.  Yet even an unstabilized IPP in meticais would
have been more stable than actual prices in Maputo since 1990.  
- In the south of the country, markets can be relied on to distribute food aid quite
widely, depending on effective demand.  Markets will be increasingly capable of this in
the north.  Nonetheless, markets cannot be the only means of food aid distribution.  In
the north, the weak marketing system may be a greater constraint to increased
domestic production than is food aid at this time.  As the marketing system develops,
food aid will become an important constraint unless it is properly managed.  In the
south and especially the central region, food aid currently is a constraint, due to
oversupply.  If consignee prices remain low, and if demand is met at these prices, white
maize producers in these areas will be faced with serious disincentives.  vi
- Information about commercial and emergency quantities and the timing of their arrival
is critical to improving the food aid program.  This information must be widely
available in a timely manner.  Greater coordination is necessary between GOM,
donors, NGO's, and private sector traders, if the food aid program is to be effectively
reformed.
Principal recommendations, meant as a starting point for discussion, are:
- Donors and GOM should begin now to move towards import parity pricing of maize. 
They should meet soon with past consignees, inform them that a decision has been
made and negotiate the best way to accomplish this.  
- The move should begin with the next ship of commercial maize; full import parity
should be reached by March, or by the first ship that arrives after March.  
- Donors and GOM should develop a system for eliciting demand from consignees.  A
total of 10 to 20 consignees for each boat (for Maputo and Beira) is probably sufficient
to ensure competition.  See Chapter Five section III.C for more detail.  Key issues
which need to be resolved include how to select the 10 to 20 consignees to be
surveyed, how to create incentives for accurate responses, and how to create
incentives for each to take delivery on the amount they indicate in the second round.
- A "step price" approach should be used to price the grain, based on a 60 month
moving average of past prices.  The marketing year should be March through
February.  See Chapter Five, section III.B.2 for more detail.  A key issue to resolve is
what type of explicit incentive, if any, should be offered armazenistas to participate as
consignees.
- We recommend that a stock of 10,000 to 15,000 metric tons be maintained in Maputo,
to prevent price rises above import parity.  The price to purchase from this stock might
be 15% to 20% above the consignee price, though this should be negotiated with
consignees.  Anyone willing to buy at least one or two metric tons at a time should
have access to the stock, but purchases by individuals during any given month should
be limited to 100 or 200 tons.  Consider requiring that all payments be made in full
upon delivery.  See Chapter Five section III.C for more detail.
- Leakage of emergency grain on to the market must be halted as quickly as possible. 
Unless this happens, any move to import parity pricing will be extremely difficult. 
- Once the emergency program is under control, the GOM and donors should move
aggressively towards cash for work projects as a partial substitute to continued free
distribution and food for work.  A key issue to be resolved is how to finance cash for
work projects.  See Chapter Five, section IV.B. for more detail.
- The GOM and donors should take the lead in forming a commission composed of
donors, officials of the Ministries of Commerce, Finance, and Agriculture, NGO's, and
interested traders, in charge of planning volumes, collecting information about market
conditions, and making this information widely available to the public.  
- The commission would need a technical secretariat with one or two well-trained
economists and technical advisors familiar with logistical planning, grain storage, and
other issues.  See Chapter Five section III.C for more detail.vii
GLOSSARY
AGRICOM Empresa Nacional de Comercialização de Produtos Agrícolas
CIF Cost, Insurance, and Freight
CIM Companhia Industrial da Matola
COGROPA Companhia Grossista de Produtos Alimentares, E.E.
DPCCN Departamento de Prevenção e Combate às Calamidades Naturais
EACM Empresa de Abastecimento da Cidade de Maputo
EACB Empresa de Abastecimento da Cidade da Beira
EC European Community
ERP Economic Rehabilitation Program
EPP Export Parity Price
GOM Government of Mozambique
IMBEC Importadora de Bens de Consumo, E.E.
IPP Import Parity Price
metical Mozambican currency (abbreviated "MT"; "meticais" plural)
MOBEIRA Moagem da Beira
NGO Non-governmental organization
NSA Novo Sistema de Abastecimento
SIMA Agricultural Market Information and Analysis System, located in the Ministry
of Agriculture under the USAID Food Security Project, technical assistance
from Michigan State University Dept. of Agricultural Economics
UNOHAC  United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination 
WFP World Food Programme1
Year Commercial Emergency and
Project
Total
----------- metric tons -----------
1987 71,888 62,393 134,281
1988 201,444 180,939 382,383
1989 140,973 120,314 261,287
1990 79,323 147,334 226,657
1991 171,690 207,325 379,015
1992 244,892 280,479 525,371
1993 91,852 390,786 482,638
  Jan-June
1 26,852 248,698 275,550
  July-Dec
2 65,000 142,088 207,088
1  Actual arrivals
2  Projected arrivals
Source: 1) 1987-1989: Min. of Commerce, Dept. of Food Security as cited in Louis
Berger (1991); 2) 1990-1993: MSU data set based on data from Min. of Commerce
"Food Aid Pledges and Shipments" Annual Reports; World Food Program
INTERFAIS database and UNILOG dispatches database; USAID unpublished data;
and EEC unpublished data.  See Annex A for more details.
Table 1. Commercial and Emergency Food Aid Arrivals of Maize (Yellow and
White) to Mozambique, 1987 - 1993
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Over a decade of civil war and highly centralized economic policies, combined most recently
with the 1991/92 Southern Africa drought, have made Mozambique one of the most food aid
dependent countries in the world.  Most food aid is in the form of yellow maize grain, and the
United States is far and away the largest single donor of this product.  From January 1992
through June 1993, approximately 800,000 metric tons of maize food aid arrived in the
country, amounting to 50 kilograms per person during that time (Table 1).  The United States1  MSU data file FAMERG.SYS.  See Annex A for documentation.  The calculation of per
capita shipments assumes a resident population of 16 million.  The food aid figures include
both commercial and emergency grain from all donors.  Most was yellow grain, but a small
proportion was white.
2  For a more detailed analysis of the informal food marketing sector, see MOA/MSU
Research Team, 1993.
2
shipped nearly 670,000 MT, or 83% of the total.
1  Total yellow maize shipments have
increased irregularly but sharply since 1987.
Historically, food aid for commercial sale ("commercial food aid" ) has been a significant
portion of the total.  From 1987 through June 1993, approximately 43% of all maize food aid
was meant for the commercial distribution network.  In years previous to the 1992 drought,
commercial food aid comprised a larger share of the total.  Officially, all commercial food aid
was marketed through the Novo Sistema de Abastecimento (NSA), a system of ration shops
set-up in Maputo, the national capital, and Beira, the principal commercial city.  Created in
1981 in Maputo and 1986 in Beira (Alderman, et al., 1991), the NSA was meant to provide a
dependable supply of a minimum subsistence ration of basic staples to registered residents of
the two cities.  Initially, a large proportion of urban and peri-urban residents in the two cities
obtained most of their food from the NSA.  With increased immigration of rural residents to
the cities in the early 1980's, the capacity of the system began to be strained.  By the mid-
1980's, as the first informal food markets began to emerge, the role of the NSA had further
diminished.  In recent years, the system has almost completely disintegrated.  From October
1991 through May 1992, less than 8% of the yellow maize grain, and only 3% of the yellow
maize flour consumed by Maputo residents was purchased in the NSA (Sahn and Desai,
1993).  In 1993, no product has been sold through the system.
The progressive decline of the NSA has coincided with the vigorous growth of private food
marketing activities in Mozambique since the first economic liberalization measures were
instituted in 1985.  In that year, vegetable markets were liberalized, and informal markets
quickly emerged.  In 1987, the scope of liberalization was dramatically widened with the
beginning of the Economic Rehabilitation Program (ERP).  Since that time, progressive
liberalization has lead to a flourishing food trade throughout southern Mozambique.
2  By
1989, informed observers estimated that no less than 25%, and as much as 80% of the maize
meant for distribution in Maputo through the NSA was in fact being sold in informal markets
(USAID/Maputo, 1990).  In 1991/92, 82% of the maize meal, and nearly 60% of the maize
grain consumed by Maputo consumers was purchased in these informal market places (Sahn
and Desai, 1993).
The dramatic expansion of informal food marketing activities in Mozambique since 1985 is
generally seen as a positive response to the significant policy liberalization that has been
instituted during that time.  Most donors and policy analysts agree that continued development
of the private food marketing sector is one of the keys to rejuvenating Mozambique's domestic
food production and allowing the country finally to emerge from its extreme dependence on
food aid.  With the signing of the peace accords in late 1992, the prospects for rapid growth in3
domestic food production, and for effective private distribution of that production, are more
promising than they have been at any time during the past two decades.  
Whether this promise is met will depend on a broad set of factors, including macroeconomic
policies, reform of the country's legal system, and the level of public and private investment in
infrastructure and productive enterprises.  The country's extreme dependence on food aid,
however, means that the way in which commercial and emergency aid are managed over the
next several years will also have a role to play in the transition to a more prosperous economy. 
Used correctly, this aid can bridge what is expected to be a narrowing gap between
consumption needs and the country's ability to meet those needs (through both domestic
production and commercial imports), while at the same time promoting the emergence of a
dynamic private production and marketing sector.  Inappropriate use of food aid, however,
can create significant barriers to this transition, and might leave the country unnecessarily
dependent on concessional imports for some time to come.  
Three key management dimensions will determine whether food aid facilitates or impedes this
transition.  These are a) the programming of food aid quantities, both emergency and
commercial, b) the pricing of commercial food aid, and c) the design of systems for the
distribution of commercial and emergency food aid.  Each of these dimensions must be
thought out carefully in the context of peaceful, market-lead development in Mozambique. 
This report has four broad objectives:
1. To clarify the conceptual issues involved in determining the effects of commercial and
emergency food aid on Mozambican producers, traders, and consumers; 
2. To analyze the specific conditions in Mozambique that will mediate these effects; 
3. To evaluate the effects on Mozambican producers, traders, and consumers of
alternative approaches to quantity programming, pricing, and distribution of food aid,
including a move to import parity pricing of commercial yellow maize food aid; and 
4. To propose a system for the programming, pricing, and distribution of food aid in
Mozambique.
The report will focus primarily on commercial food aid.  Nevertheless, Mozambique's
continued need for emergency aid for some years to come, and the effects this aid may
continue to have on markets, require that it also be given attention.  Thus, emergency food aid
issues will be dealt with as they affect markets and producer production incentives.  
The report is based on intensive work carried-out by faculty and staff of the MOA/MSU Food
Security Project on the food aid issue over the past three months, as well as information
gathered and lessons learned by the Project over the past three years.  In early June, an MSU
Research Associate travelled to Mozambique for two months to intensify the investigation of
the food aid issue in collaboration with in-country staff.  She and the Mozambican staff
conducted interviews with 15 Mozambican consignees and numerous informal traders, and
officials involved in the food aid program.  Due to the importance of white maize trade within4
the region, she also travelled to Swaziland and South Africa to consult with traders and
government officials in those countries.  While there, the project developed a better
understanding of the influence of policy in those countries on the white maize trade.  This is an
issue which will be quite important in evaluating any move to import parity pricing for yellow
maize in Mozambique.  In addition to extensive interviews, an attempt was made to collect
data on food aid arrivals from as many sources as possible, and to create as accurate a data
base as possible on those arrivals.
The report is organized as follows.  Chapter Two speaks to the objectives of food aid in
Mozambique, including the implications of the ending of the war for those objectives and the
means by which they are pursued.  Chapter Three reviews Mozambique's experience to date
with food aid, chronicling the break-down of the NSA, the emergence of informal markets,
and the situation as of mid 1993.  Chapter Four presents conceptual and empirical views of the
effects of food aid on retail and producer prices.  Both abstract economic theory and detailed
knowledge of market conditions in Mozambique are used to draw conclusions about how food
aid might affect prices at each level.  Based in part on this analysis, Chapter Five presents a
detailed discussion of alternative approaches to the programming, pricing, and distribution of
food aid, including both commercial and emergency.  Chapter Six presents conclusions and
recommendations.5
CHAPTER TWO
THE OBJECTIVES OF FOOD AID IN MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique's transition to a peace-time economy, which began with the signing of the peace
accord between FRELIMO and RENAMO leaders on October 4 1992, has important
implications for the objectives and management of food aid.  It is important that the nature of
these implications be understood if food aid is to facilitate the transition out of war and into a
dynamic economy with effective markets and economic institutions.  In addition, it is
necessary to understand the sometimes competing interests of food aid donors and recipients.
I. The Transition to Peace
Within Mozambique, donors and the GOM largely agreed on the principal objectives of food
aid prior to October 1992.  The overarching objective was to bridge the gap between domestic
production and some measure of food needs.  Related objectives were to ensure a safety net
for urban consumers (i.e., low cost supplies of selected staple foods), and to provide relief for
impoverished rural residents, primarily deslocados, without sufficient production or effective
demand to meet basic caloric needs.  Other shared objectives were to save foreign exchange
and finance development activities.
These objectives were not substantially different from those in many other countries receiving
large amounts of aid, and were probably appropriate, given Mozambique's precarious
condition throughout the decade of the 1980's.  Domestic production except for family sector
subsistence had largely collapsed, such that, by 1988, total grain imports (both commercial
and as food aid) amounted to 85-90% of total marketed supplies (Kyle 1991).  By 1989, the
value of exports had fallen to only 13% of imports (the latter not including the imputed value
of food aid), and the current account deficit for that year was more than $750 million (Kyle
1991).  In rural areas, even in the higher potential north, substantial proportions of family
sector households were caught in very low levels of income and calorie consumption
(MOA/MSU 1992b).  Without question, the food aid program prevented the starvation of
thousands, possibly millions, of people.  
Despite this, two qualifications need to be raised in any discussion of the objectives and
success of food aid in Mozambique.  First, the success achieved in attaining the objectives has
been mixed.  The safety net was initially pursued through the sale of commercial food aid
through the NSA at prices well below CIF levels.  The eventual failure of this system has
already been discussed.  Emergency food aid was channelled to impoverished rural households
through a system of government enterprises (primarily DPCCN - Departamento de Prevenção
e Combate às Calamidades Naturais), bilateral and multilateral donor organizations, and
private non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  This system suffered from serious problems,
though as mentioned it undoubtedly saved many lives.  Principal among the problems were
large diversions to informal markets of grain meant for emergency distribution, with negative
consequences for markets for local production (see below).  3  See also Riley (1992) for a more recent discussion of the collection of counterpart funds.
6
Foreign exchange savings were a natural outcome of the food aid program, facilitated by the
donors largely dropping the typical "additionality" condition.  This is a condition in U.S. food
aid legislation which requires that aid be additional to normal commercial imports in the
receiving country, rather than substituting for those imports (Ruttan 1993).  This requirement
is related to the surplus disposal objective of the U.S. government, and is an attempt to use
food aid to increase the total amount of exports, concessionary and commercial.  At the same
time, U.S. legislation states that food aid should not cause any production disincentives in the
receiving country.  Yet by making food aid additional to normal imports, total supply in the
receiving country is increased, which will, under most circumstances, reduce prices below
what they would otherwise have been.  Producers can thus face reduced production
incentives.  These two objectives, to ensure additionality and at the same time avoid
production disincentives in the receiving country, thus are in clear conflict.  The difficulties of
reconciling them are central to many struggles over food aid throughout the world.
While foreign exchange has been saved through the program, the same straightforward
success cannot be claimed for the financing of development projects.  Significant funds have
been generated, yet the World Bank's 1989 Food Security Study concluded that the amounts
deposited in accounts for the recuperation of counterpart funds from the sale of commercial
food aid reached only 13% of the CIF value of the donated commodities in 1988 (cited in
USAID, 1990)
3.  The reason for the very low figure was a combination of government fixed
sales prices below import parity, and difficulties in collecting funds on all delivered product,
associated with large leakage into informal markets.  The foregone revenue amounted to
nearly 10% of expected total tax revenue during that year.  In recent years, increased GOM
and donor attention to this issue has improved collection rates.
The second qualification is that, due apparently to the war, certain concerns that typically
accompany a high reliance on food aid were pushed to the background.  For one, the effects of
food aid on domestic production were not given top priority during the war.  Too, the
promotion of private sector food marketing activities was not initially given a high priority in
the commercial food aid program, though this began to change over the past two years.  The
reduced emphasis given to these two concerns was probably appropriate in a war-time setting. 
Rural marketing risks and the difficulty of buying food and consumer goods in rural markets
had already pushed many smallholders towards a marked reliance on own production to
ensure their survival (MOA/MSU 1992b).  The prospects for a vigorous marketing response
in the midst of the war could not be considered good.  
Yet Mozambique is no longer at war, and it has staked its economic future on making a
successful transition to a market economy with a largely private production and marketing
sector.  Thus, the objectives of the food aid program, and the means of attaining them, must
be rethought in the context of this transition.  A key question is whether commercial food aid
should be used to create a new urban safety net to replace the NSA, or whether it should be
used simply to close the gap between market demand and supply (from domestic production
and imports) at market prices.  Regarding emergency food aid, a key challenge will be to
design a system that will meet the needs of impoverished rural residents, refugees returning4  See Isenman and Singer (1977) for an early review of this issue.  See also Von Braun and
Huddleston (1988), Jones (1989), and Shaw (1991).
5  The concepts of import parity and export parity prices will be important throughout this
paper.  The IPP is a measure of the opportunity cost of domestic production for a country
which imports the product, or which would do so if policy permitted.  It is the price the
country would pay if it imported, and is calculated as the CIF world price adjusted for
transport costs to internal consumption points.  The EPP is an opportunity cost measure for a
country which exports, or which would do so if policy permitted.  It is the price the country
would receive to export to world markets, and is typically considered to be equal to the FOB
price in the relevant world market port (e.g., U.S. Gulf).
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from Malawi, and demobilized FRELIMO and RENAMO troops while not impeding the
transition to increased domestic production and marketing.
II. The Compatibility of Donor and Mozambican Objectives
The strongest and most persistent criticism that has been formulated against food aid in
general, not just in Mozambique, is that it creates a discincentive for domestic production,
thereby contributing to long term dependence.
4  This criticism stems from the use of food aid
by industrialized countries as a tool for surplus disposal.  In this argument, the recipient
country's need for the product is given secondary importance relative to the donor's desire to
a) reduce the costs of its own agricultural policies through reduction of stocks, and b) open
new markets, increasing commercial demand for donor production and thus reducing the need
for donor governments to accumulate future stocks.  The additionality requirement in U.S.
food aid legislation is one outgrowth of this concern in donor countries.  Yet, as mentioned
previously, U.S. legislation also attempts to guard against production disincentives, so that no
simple portrayal of donor objectives captures the whole truth.  
Before the disincentive issue can be clearly addressed, one must answer the question
"disincentive compared to what"?  If we begin with a closed economy whose market clearing
price is above the import price, then any import, be it commercial or concessional, will
decrease domestic market prices.  This will create a "disincentive" for local production
compared to the previously closed situation.  Thus, a yardstick is needed against which to
measure whether a disincentive has in fact been created.  In what follows, the world price will
be used as that yardstick.  Any policy which results in market clearing domestic prices below
the export parity price (EPP) will be judged to cause a disincentive to local production, while
any policy that increases these domestic prices above the import parity price (IPP) will be seen
to cause an artificial production incentive.
5  Market clearing prices between export and import
parity will be considered neutral.
Empirical evidence across many countries indicates that the disincentive criticism has been
exaggerated (Von Braun and Huddleston, 1988).  Probably the most important conclusion that
can be drawn from the many studies of food aid is that government price and import policy in
general, and its policy toward food aid in particular, are the primary determinants of food aid's
effects on domestic production.  Quoting Timmer, et al. (1983):8
Is Objective Attained when Food Aid is:
Not Additional to
Normal Imports and
sold at Market Prices?
Additional to Normal






  Avoid Disincentive Yes No Probably not
  Save Foreign Exchange Yes No Yes
  Increase Consumption No Yes Yes
  Increase Dev. Resources Yes Yes No
DONOR OBJECTIVES
  Reduce Stocks No Yes Yes
  Open Markets Possibly (long term) Probably Possibly
Note: Adapted from Von Braun and Huddleston (1988)
Table 2. Relationship Between Food Aid Characteristics and Donor and Recipient
Country Objectives
Countries that relied on food aid supplies to keep prices low (relative to world
prices) created serious disincentives for their farmers.  In countries where aid
displaced imports, did not distort farm prices, and had a large enough flow to
affect the level of ... resources available for development, its impact was
entirely mediated by the ... (country's) development strategy.  When this was
positive ... aid helped.  When it was not ... it did not. (p. 289, parentheses
added)
Table 2 summarizes the extent to which recipient and donor country objectives are attainable
under alternative management policies for food aid.  Each column represents a different
management approach, or food aid policy, and the body of the text indicates whether each of
the given objectives is obtainable under each approach.  Clearly, not all objectives are
attainable under a given policy.  If disincentives to local production are to be avoided,
commercial food aid must not be additional to normal imports.  Thus, the recipient country
objectives of increased consumption and expanded development resources must be given
lower priority, as must both of the donor objectives.  If donor objectives or recipient country
consumption objectives are pursued aggressively, production disincentives will likely be
created, and foreign exchange will not be saved.  9
Local donor missions can play a key role in balancing the interests of host and donor country
governments with the interests of recipient country citizens, both consumers and producers. 
Three key challenges in Mozambique are: 
a) to develop a system to decrease commercial food aid shipments in an orderly
way and in response to market demand for yellow maize within Mozambique, 
b) to reduce emergency shipments in response to real reductions in need, and 
c) to redesign the distribution of emergency aid to minimize negative impacts on
local production and the development of local markets.  
Two aspects of local market development are relevant, and each can be negatively affected by
poor food aid management.  The incentive to produce for the market is directly related to
expected price levels, which can be dramatically influenced by food aid quantities.  Price levels
may also affect incentives for traders to participate in the market, but probably more important
is the way in which food aid is delivered.  Commercial food aid going to very few consignees
obviously decreases competition, at least at some levels of the system.  Free emergency
distribution, if not targeted very effectively to those without effective demand, may remove
much of the market for commercial traders and processors.  Neither of these situations is
conducive to the development of a healthy private production and marketing sector in
Mozambique.6  Discussion concerning meals and their quality can be found in Chapter V.  
7  The Mozambican livestock sector basically disappeared during the war, so leakage into feed
was not a difficulty there, unlike other countries in the region.
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CHAPTER THREE
FOOD AID AND MARKETS:
THE MOZAMBICAN FOOD AID EXPERIENCE TO DATE
I. The NSA and Food Rationing in Maputo and Beira
In the early 1980s, the combination of weather problems and war interrupted the supply of
food to the cities, causing long lines and shortages.  Coupled with decreased exports and a
lack of foreign exchange, commercial imports could not meet the food needs of the cities.  In
response, the government of Mozambique established the Novo Sistema de Abastecimento
(New Supply System) (NSA) to distribute and ration limited food supplies, first in 1981 in
Maputo and then in 1986 in Beira.  Goods under the fixed price NSA regime were yellow
maize grain and flours, rice, sugar, edible oil, beans, dry fish, salt, and soap.  The central
government fixed prices at all levels of this system and organized supplies and distribution
through government warehousing agents and wholesalers (EACM in Maputo and EACB in
Beira).  Marketed food aid was imported for distribution until September 1990 through using
IMBEC (Importadora de Bens de Consumo, E.E.) and then through COGROPA, EACM,
CIM and Mobeira.  As the main mills in Maputo and Beira, CIM and Mobeira received grain
which was processed into a partially de-germed meal for distribution within the NSA system
6. 
COGROPA was responsible for the distribution of food aid grain within the system, while
EACM and EACB distributed flours and other products for the NSA.  The DPCCN handled
emergency food aid supplies in a completely separate operation, distributing commodities free
of charge in rural areas, often in collaboration with international NGO's.
After functioning with some effectiveness for the first few years, the NSA began to lose
importance.  From 1987 onward, fewer and fewer supplies were available from NSA shops. 
The combination of unreliable and irregular arrivals of food aid and the emergence of private
sector markets reduced consumers' dependence on the NSA shops.  Substantial leakages
occurred from both the NSA and the emergency distribution system into the private sector.  
Louis Berger International (1991) estimated the leakages from the NSA to be 50 percent or
greater in 1990/91.  This does not mean that the food aid left the human food chain
7; instead,
the maize was available through the local dumbanengue (informal market, called chungamoio
in Beira), at a higher price than that officially set for the NSA shops.    
II. Economic Rehabilitation Program (ERP) and Food Aid Allocations
As discussed earlier, in 1987 the ERP greatly broadened the scope of market liberalization
efforts which were already under way in the country.  As a result, markets for a wide range of
food and non-food items rapidly sprung-up in urban areas.  Over time, these markets spread to8  Of the estimated 245,000 mt of commercial grain that arrived in 1992, 170,000 have already
been delivered to private sector consignees.  These amounts give a figure of 69%.  26,000 mt
are still in the warehouses at the port and listed under ownership of the Ministry of
Commerce.  If all of this grain is eventually delivered to private consignees, they will have
received 80% of the total (196,000/245,000).
9  See MOA/MSU (1993) for more detail on the informal food marketing system in Maputo
and southern Mozambique.
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outlying rural areas.  The objectives of food aid under the ERP still include assuring
accessibility of the poor in urban areas to staple foods.  However, the program placed
increased importance on the role of commercial food aid in providing counterpart funds to the
Government for general budgetary support as well as for specific development purposes. 
Both the Mozambican Government and the donors sought to introduce greater fiscal
responsibility into the commercial food aid system.  Public sector agents, including CIM,
IMBEC, and COGROPA, were in arrears in the payment of counterpart funds, so donors and
the Ministry of Commerce approached the private sector in 1991 to receive and market food
aid, particularly yellow maize shipments in Maputo and Beira.  Private firms were the direct
consignees for 20 percent of the total 1991 commercial yellow maize food aid shipments
(23,000 out of 113,000 mt; Austral 1992).  By 1992, this figure had risen to approximately
75%.
8
Private sector consignees were chosen on the basis of financial capacity and likelihood of
payment of counterpart funds, logistical capability (transport and storage), and geographical
area of operations.  This latter criterion was used in an attempt to allocate specific quantities
to various regions of the country.  When the Ministry of Commerce requested food aid,
regional allocations were specified and consignees were selected to distribute according to
that allocation.  A consignee was authorized to receive product for Nampula province, for
example, if it had a major center of operations in Nampula.  However, there was little
enforcement of the distribution of such allocations by the Ministry of Commerce.  While it is
clear that some consignees did distribute in the areas they were assigned, it is also clear that
much grain flowed purely in response to market prices.  The amount of supplies that actually
were distributed outside the port cities is thought to be quite large, but cannot be accurately
quantified.
9  
Allocations to specific traders and parastatal consignees are usually decided by a committee
composed of representatives of the Ministry of Commerce Department, the Ministry of
Finance, and the Bank of Mozambique.  Several traders in Maputo and elsewhere complained
that the decision making process is not transparent.  Traders do not know why they receive
amounts that are less than or greater than the amount that they solicited.  In some shipments,
more than three times the amount of grain arriving was requested, so the government had to
ration the quantity among consignees.  Some consignees have raised the issue of favoritism in
the allocation of limited quantities.10  See MOA/MSU Research Team (1993) for more detail.  Note that the number of
consignees on the previous shipment in May, 1992 was less than 10.
11   All prices in this paper are stated in nominal terms unless stated otherwise.
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The allocation system has been superseded in some cases by the donors, an example being the
July 1992 maize shipment from the EEC.  The EEC places very high priority upon financial
solvency and payment of counterpart funds.  Ensuring competitive marketing of the food aid
appears to be less of a concern.  In the case of the July shipment, the EEC chose two private
consignees, one a wholesaler and one a miller, to receive 7,500 metric tons each.  In contrast,
the USAID shipment received about three weeks later was allocated to 27 consignees by the
interministerial committee after a newspaper announcement soliciting requests for
allocations.
10  
Maximum prices for food aid products have been set by the Commissão Nacional de Salarios
e Preços, not by the Ministry of Commerce.  In their efforts to keep food prices low, the
prices for many goods were regulated at all levels from consignee to retail level through 1987. 
With the ERP, some products were deregulated, but yellow maize was among those goods for
which the government continued to set price until very recently.  In August 1993, the prices
for yellow maize and remaining consumer goods were officially liberalized, legalizing what had
already been occurring in markets for at least two years.  The market prices for food staples
are thus determined by supply and demand forces for each commodity.  
III.  The Informal Retail Sector
The entrance of private traders as direct food aid consignees was less important in the
weakening of the NSA than the emergence of parallel markets throughout the major urban
areas.  From 1987 onwards, in both Maputo and Beira, informal markets became a major
source of consumption goods, particularly for lower income consumers.  The official retail
prices were below the informal market prices for maize products.  However, there was a
substantial margin for owners of NSA shops and others to divert foods from the official
market to the dumbanengues.  For example, in May of 1992, the official price of maize grain
sales to the public was 485 meticais per kg, while the average retail price for yellow grain in
Mucoriama market in Maputo was 45% higher, at 702 meticais per kg (USAID/Maputo
unpublished
11).  These diversions, coupled with the irregular arrival of food aid supplies,
resulted in NSA shops' inability to meet consumer needs.  Sahn and Desai (1993) present
survey results indicating that only 34.6 percent of households in Maputo with ration cards
actually purchased any NSA commodities (during the survey period October 1991 - April
1992), whereas the parallel markets accounted for up to 82 percent of household purchases
for NSA commodities (82 percent for yellow maize flour 
with bran; 59 percent of yellow maize grain).  In addition, informal markets present
advantages for low income consumers, primarily in the ability to make very small purchases on
a daily basis.12  For the 1993/94 marketing year, it was estimated that 10,000 metric tons would leave
Swaziland for Mozambique (Famine Early Warning System, Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperation, Kingdom of Swaziland).  This number was estimated to evaluate food security
for Swaziland and should be used with caution as an approximation.  Actual quantities may
have been significantly larger.
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IV. Commercial Maize Imports
Aside from national production of white maize, the informal sector obtains yellow maize from
diverted food aid and white maize (mostly meal) from small scale commercial imports from
neighboring countries.  In Maputo, maize products, along with sugar and wheat flour, are
imported by small scale traders (primarily women), although the quantity of these unofficial
imports is unknown.  Since those imports violate Customs Union (SACU) agreements for
Swaziland and import duties are rarely paid in Mozambique, maintaining records is difficult at
best.
12   The Maputo/Manzini road was open even during times of war, but hijackings and
attacks limited traders' travel to periods when the price margins were fairly high.  In July and
August of 1992, monitoring of the Basuca wholesale market in Maputo indicated that 11% of
the volume of all products arriving came from Swaziland and South Africa (MOA/MSU
Research Team 1993).  Of all white maize grain and meals arriving in the market, 49.8% was
from Swaziland.  This is consistent with the historical importance in Maputo of the white
maize trade with Swaziland, but white maize supplies throughout the region were extremely
scarce during this period due to the southern Africa drought.  Thus, it is unclear whether this
figure reflects Swaziland's typical share in the Maputo market.  Although the risk of attack has
decreased with the signing of the Peace Accord, informal trade in maize products between
Mozambique and Swaziland has not increased due to the relatively high cost of white maize
products in Swaziland, and the over supply of yellow maize in Maputo.  Imports depend upon
the relative prices of products in the countries as well as the risks and costs of transport and
availability of foreign exchange.  
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, the presence of large maize stocks in
Mozambique has kept prices low in the country; however, as these stocks diminish, through
consumption or deterioration, prices should begin once again to rise.  The informal flow of
maize products from Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Malawi, or South Africa should then increase to
more normal levels.
Currently there are no large scale commercial maize imports to Mozambique, though rice is
imported in this way.  When asked why the two products were so different in this regard,
traders indicated that maize trade is a high risk venture for them.  The planning of emergency
and commercial food aid shipments is not transparent.  Food aid shipments are often delayed
or rescheduled, volumes are changed, and there is no systematic mechanism for making that
information publically available.  One trader said that he depended upon faxes from port
authorities around the world to know what was due to arrive in Mozambique.  Most traders
are not so well connected, and therefore are subject to great uncertainty.  Traders also raised
the issue of grain quality.  Given the price risks indicated elsewhere in this paper, traders
prefer to deal with rice and other commodities for which the aid shipments are smaller, the
price risks are smaller, or the margins are greater to cover the risks.   13  Accurate data is difficult to come by, and different sources can give different numbers.  See
Annex A for documentation of the data base constructed by the authors. 
14  WFP (WFP, 1993a) estimates emergency maize stocks of 58,198 and commercial maize
stocks of 38,200 throughout the country as of 1 May 1993.  Emergency requirements for
Maputo province are 10,962 over the May 93 - April 94 period; total emergency needs for
May 93 - Dec 93 in Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane provinces are 33,233 metric tons for
returnees and internally displaced persons.  This does not include anything for the market
sector; it is strictly emergency needs.
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Regional trade in white maize only occurs informally at the present time, although triangular
aid purchases have been used in the past.  The triangular purchases involve commercial
transactions in one country (for example, WFP purchases maize in Zimbabwe) for delivery as
food aid in Mozambique.  This kind of trading seems more likely in the future than formal
commercial trade in maize between Mozambique and its neighbors.  Traders in South Africa
and Swaziland mentioned the legal difficulties and high costs with operations in Mozambique. 
One trader from South Africa indicated that his firm closed a Maputo office because it could
not compete in the market without informal payments at the border and other illegal activities. 
Informal trade is likely to continue.
V. The Current Situation
To avert famine with the recent drought, donors responded with large quantities of food aid. 
Between August and December 1992, approximately 330,000 metric tons of yellow maize
arrived in Mozambique as emergency, commercial, or project food aid (WFP 1993b
13).  This is
more than double the amount of maize grain that entered the country during the same period
of 1991.  Looking at the period when the prices were relatively stable, from July 1990 through
July 1991, the average monthly arrival of commercial yellow maize grain was about 9,000
metric tons.  Just for the commercial programs, the average monthly arrival during the last five
months of 1992 was 39,000 metric tons.  These unprecedented volumes badly strained storage
and distribution capacity.  The important lesson from this episode is the need for much better
coordination among donors, GOM, and private sector consignees.
As a result, both private and public sector agents in Mozambique have experienced since at
least February 1993 serious difficulties with yellow maize.  The difficulties include existing
stocks in poor quality, continued arrival of new emergency grain, very low retail prices in
some areas (even below prices paid by consignees), as well as substantial leakages of
emergency food aid on to the market.  Through a lack of coordinated emergency and
commercial food aid planning and poor timing of some aid arrivals, there are surplus stocks of
yellow maize in Maputo and Beira.  In Maputo, commercial food aid maize stocks were
estimated to be 37,900 metric tons on July 14 1993, most of which arrived in late 1992.  On
the emergency side, 76,000 metric tons for reserve stocks arrived during July, of which 51,600
was for Maputo and the southern zone, augmenting what was already in country.
14  These
stocks and arrivals coincide with the harvest period for domestic white maize production,
which occurs primarily from April through August.  SIMA data shows that yellow maize
prices were very low not only in port cities, but also in interior areas such as Gaza and15  The degree of substitutability between white and yellow maize is central to a discussion of
the potential disincentive effects of yellow maize food aid on white maize production.  This
issue will be addressed in more detail in section IV of Chapter Four.
15
Inhambane in the south and Manica and Chimoio in the central region.  White maize prices
were also extremely low in the central region.
To estimate maize stock needs and outflows, it is necessary to estimate the consumption needs
in both the markets and the emergency programs.  World Food Programme and the Ministry
of Commerce Department of Food Security have worked to determine those needs, but
without a new census and detailed information on refugees and internal migration of
population, it is difficult to assess the expected drawdown from stocks.  Recent estimates for
monthly consumption in the southern zone of the country are for 12,000 metric tons of maize
for the emergency programs.  In the past, monthly arrivals of 9,000 metric tons of commercial
food aid have resulted in relative price stability, giving at least an approximation of demand in
the market sector.  In the hands of just the private agents in Maputo, there were about 30,000
metric tons of commercial yellow maize grain in mid-July.  White maize stocks are unknown;
some private traders have purchased white maize from local production and will retain it in
storage; but some traders indicate that by October, additional maize supplies will be needed. 
Most of the current stocks of yellow maize are in poor condition and will most likely not be
acceptable for human consumption by October.    
 
White and yellow maize are close substitutes and their prices tend to move together, except
during times of great scarcity.
15  Figure 1 of Chapter Four indicates that since December 1992,
the price of yellow maize has been relatively stable, around 450-500 meticais per kilo, in spite
of no significant commercial food aid arrivals since January.  For the first time, the private
sector demand for yellow maize has been met and exceeded such that consignees do not take
their full allotment and stocks remain in government possession in warehouses.  At least one
reason for the lack of interest in commercial food aid stocks is the presence of emergency





















NA = Not available in market
Source: SIMA, MOA/MSU Food Security Research
Project
Table 3. Mean Retail Market Prices of White and Yellow Grain in Selected Areas
of Southern, Central and Northern Mozambique, May-September, 1993
Given the transport and communication difficulties within the country, surplus yellow maize
food aid in some areas depresses the prices for domestically-produced white maize, while in
other markets prices for white maize remain relatively high (Table 3).
16  For example, in the
central region (see Figure 2 in Chapter Four for a map of Mozambique) prices of both yellow
and white maize grain were extremely low between May and September, 1993.  As a point of
comparison, the minimum producer price for white maize grain during 1993 was 425 MT/kg,
nearly 70% above the mean retail market prices in Manica and Chimoio, and 16% above the
retail price in Beira.  The consignee price (wholesale level) for commercial food aid yellow17
maize was 329 MT/kg during this time, about double the retail yellow grain prices in Manica
and Chimoio and 28% above the retail price in Beira.  On average in the central region, white
grain prices were about 50% greater than yellow grain prices. 
In the southern region, yellow maize prices were approximately double those in the central
region, but still low when compared with the marketing costs which must be added to the 329
MT/kg consignee price.  Despite the large amount of yellow grain in the market, white grain
prices could not be considered depressed in this area (as they were in the central region),
averaging 841 MT/kg, more than 100% above yellow grain prices.
White grain prices were relatively low in Nampula province of the northern region, though this
does not appear to be directly related to the presence of yellow maize in the market: this grain
never appeared in the Ribaue and Monapo markets, and was present only during five weeks in
Nampula city.
Traders outside Maputo complained of the irregular arrivals of large quantities of emergency
yellow maize food aid which would swamp a local market, making it impossible for the
commercial sector to operate.  Leakages from emergency food aid arrive on the market in two
basic ways: illegal diversion from the program, and families selling food they obtained in food
for work or free distribution programs to purchase other goods.  In small markets, the latter
influence is thought to be important, whereas in larger markets, such as Xai-Xai, the illegal
movement of emergency maize results in a selling price below the consignee price for maize,
as occurred in July 1993.  Entire truck loads of grain have been known to disappear.
When yellow maize is distributed free or against work to households during the white maize
harvest, yellow maize flows back into the markets.  Households prefer white maize when it is
available, depending upon the relative prices of the two grains.  After years of war and at least
a year of drought, households may use the cash from yellow maize sales to make long-delayed
purchases or to pay back accumulated debt.  While this benefits the individual households
making the sales, it contributes to the depressed prices in markets, and thus undercuts local
producers.
The prices for yellow maize in Manica and other markets in the country indicate that yellow
maize emergency food aid must be entering the markets either through household sales or
through theft, since retail prices are below those of the consignees, excluding even transport
costs.  In eight markets of the Agricultural Market and Information System (SIMA), the
average May retail price was below 329 MT/kg, the consignee price at port (PSA_M.
MA/MSU, May 1993).  With such low prices, consignees with stocks would have to sell
yellow maize at a loss.
In all commercial food aid shipments prior to November 1992, consignees competed for the
rights to receive an allocation.  By November 1992, however, a combination of a higher
consignee price (up to 362 meticais per kilo from 249) along with continued arrivals of both
commercial and emergency yellow maize, resulted in an excess supply of food aid maize in
relation to the demand by consignees.  Consignees refusing to accept all of the maize allotted
to them was evidence of the excess supply.  Quality issues have been raised by consignees
regarding some of the shipments, as well.  The unfortunate result is excess supplies of yellow18
maize which will no longer be in good condition when the need for food rises again in October
or November.
To support producers of white maize, the government through its Commissão Nacional de
Salarios e Preços established on March 24 1993 a pan-territorial minimum producer price for
white maize of 425 meticais per kg.  AGRICOM, the government marketing agency, lacks
sufficient capital and access to new lines of credit to purchase all white maize offered at this
official price, so there is no effective government mechanism to assure that farmers receive the
minimum price.  As the SIMA indicates, there are markets throughout the country in which
farmers are receiving much less than the minimum, while in other markets the average price is
higher (PSA-M, MA/MSU, various months, 1993).  The estimated production was 533,000
metric tons, yet the marketed surplus is estimated to be only 80,000 metric tons
(MEDIAFAX, May 19 1993).  Observers from Medicins Sans Frontier (MSF) indicate that
rural households do not appear to be building up their food stocks.  Most households, even
during the harvest period, indicate less than 3 months of food needs in household stocks.  The
extent to which the war and drought have modified expectations and actions regarding stocks
remains to be seen.  During the war, food stocks were an easy target for confiscation or theft,
such that rural families were unable to retain stocks.  Storage facilities, where they existed,
were targets; warehouses can be seen in many parts of the country without roofs or window
panes, just empty shells.  Rebuilding such facilities, as well as improving household storage
capacity, are part of the economic rehabilitation necessary in rural areas.  Unfortunately, in the
months prior to the 1994 harvest, rural supplies may be very small compared to needs.  The
return of refugees adds to the rural food aid needs.  17  This section draws heavily from Weber, et al. (1992).
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CHAPTER FOUR
FOOD AID EFFECTS ON PRICES:
CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL VIEWS
I. Types of Grains and Meals in the Market
17
Any review of food aid and maize marketing in Mozambique (or any country in Southern
Africa) requires that analysis carefully distinguish among the different qualities of maize meal
and between the color of the grain used as raw material for the meal.  Consumer preference in
Mozambique for maize meal is clearly affected by color and quality of the final product
consumed.  This means specifying in the analysis whether meals are made at home or in a
custom or commercial mill, and how much of the germ and bran has been removed.  This
process is commonly referred to in Portuguese as removing some or all of the "farelo", either
by hand or by machine.  The final product, "chima" in Portuguese, or "Uswa" or "Uswha" in
Changane, is made by adding maize meal to boiling water.  It is eaten with a sauce made from
green leafy plants of various types, and other high protein foods, depending on resources
available.  
Consumers eat maize meal made commercially or by hand pounding.  There are three major
ways that consumers in cities of Mozambique traditionally prepare their own maize meal by
first purchasing maize grain and then hand processing it, mostly at home.  All forms of these
traditional products remove the germ and bran - "farelo".  In general, these meals are
produced only with white grain; for a number of reasons, yellow grain is not hand-pounded. 
Hand Pound Meal-Pilão is a very high quality meal that is made by first removing the germ
and bran by hand pounding in the pilão, next soaking the remains in water for 1 to 2 days
(deixar de molho), and then preparing the final meal, also by hand pounding in the "pilao".  
The meal that emerges from the second pounding must be sun dried, which can take another
day, depending on the weather.
Hand Pound Meal-Alguidar is a variation used mostly in the South of the country to make a
maize paste that is cooked immediately, in contrast to meal which can be stored for a number
of days.  The first two stages are the same: the farelo is removed by hand pounding in the
pilão and the remains are then soaked for 1 or 2 days.  Next the soft corn remains are placed
directly into a shallow bowl-"alguidar"-and slowly mashed with a wooden instrument.  After
preparing, a pasty material is placed a little bit at a time into boiling water to prepare the
chima.  This product still requires at least two days to prepare, though it is quicker than
making a final meal in the pilão.
Hand Pound/Custom Milled Meal is also a variation on the first method.  The first stage of
processing is identical.  But rather than soaking, the pounded grain is taken directly to a small20
custom hammer mill, rather than pounded in the pilao.  Grain can thus be de-germed and
made into meal in the same day.  This method, while much faster, still takes a number of
hours, due primarily to the hand pounding.
The three main types of wholly machine processed maize meals are: 
 
Whole meal, produced by small custom hammer mills spread throughout both urban and rural
areas.  Dry whole grain is placed directly into the hammer mill.  Since the germ and bran are
not removed, whole meal has a 97-99% extraction rate, so except for minor impurities, almost
all the grain put into the mill comes back as meal.  Across much of Southern Africa this meal
is referred to as mugaiwa, 
Partially de-germed meal, from which a part of the bran and germ has been removed by a
commercial process.  Normally done only in large commercial mills in Maputo and Beira, this
meal generally has an 80-96% extraction rate per 100 kgs. of grain.  This meal is referred to as
partly sifted meal, bolted meal, or roller meal in most SADC countries, and
Fully de-germed meal from which most of the bran and germ has been removed by a
commercial milling process.  This has a 60-75% extraction rate per 100 kgs. of grain.  This is
referred to as super-sifted meal or sometimes breakfast meal in Southern African countries. 
Pre-independence, this product was made in Mozambique and was sold under the brand name
Celeste.  Many consumers still refer to this brand name as a type of very high quality maize
meal.  This quality meal is also referred to in Mozambique as farinha matabicho because it is
consumed at breakfast (matabicho).  To the extent this product is currently available in these
two urban markets in Mozambique it is generally imported informally from Swaziland or
Zimbabwe.  Commercial mills in Maputo and Beira have the milling equipment to manufacture
this product, but produce very little, if any, for the open market.
To make matters more complicated, generally for machine milled maize meals there are also
quality differences within each type of meal depending on the milling technique utilized, the
quality and degree of impurities in the raw grain, and whether or not vitamins have been added
to nutritionally enrich the meal.  
In Maputo, the most common meal in informal markets is yellow whole meal.  This product
can be found except during periods of extreme scarcity of yellow grain.  Partially degermed
yellow meal is the next most common, though its availability depends on whether CIM (the
local industrial mill) obtains food aid supplies.  Prior to the Southern Africa drought, partially
degermed white meal, both domestic and from Swaziland, was quite common, and whole
white meal could also be found on most days.  These two products have been extremely
scarce since about March 1992.  The hand pounded meals are produced almost exclusively
with white grain, but seldom appear on the market in Maputo (they are much more common in
Beira).18  The price difference between white and yellow grain increased dramatically after the effects
of the 1992 drought began to be felt.  White maize was in such scarce supply that its prices
remained very high even as yellow maize prices fluctuated with the arrival of food aid
shipments.  Prior to and after the drought, white maize grain prices tracked yellow prices very
closely.  See Figure 1.
19  Estimates of the productivity difference between white and yellow grain are about 15%. 
Thus, the market should be able to support at least that large a price difference between the
grains.  The actual observed differences in Mozambique have been strongly influenced by
administratively determined quantities of yellow maize from food aid, and prices out of
Swaziland.  The latter hold no systematic relationship to the price at which commercial yellow
maize food aid is first sold.  Whether the price difference would be even lower than that
observed to date in a fully market setting must await further research.
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II. Maize Grain and Meal Preferences at Retail
The conventional wisdom in Eastern and Southern Africa is that urban consumers strongly
prefer the refined white maize meals produced by industrial roller mill technology, and are not
responsive to price differences between various types and colors of meal.  Emerging evidence
throughout the region calls this belief into question.  In Mozambique, the evidence is clear that
consumers will choose other grades of flour if the market presents them with choices based on
price.  Based on Maputo price data from March 1990 through June 1993, consumers shopping
in informal markets in Maputo have typically paid a 35% to 38% premium for white grain over
yellow grain.
18  The preference for white color over yellow color that this premium reveals is
less than one might have expected from many statements regarding the strength of preference
for white maize.
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Price premiums for partially degermed yellow meal over whole yellow meal have been about
30% between 1990 and 1993.  At these price relationships, poor consumers strongly prefer
whole yellow meal.  Sahn and Desai (1992) estimate that the poorest 20% of consumers in the
capitol city, Maputo, allocate 15% of total expenditures to yellow maize grain and meal, and
only 3% to white maize and meals.  Whole yellow meal alone has a 6.6% share.  Within this
quintile, only vegetables and fruits have a higher budget share than whole yellow meal.  The
upper 20% of income earners allocate only 1.5% of expenditures to yellow grain and meals,
and about the same to white maize and meals.   
III. Effects on Retail Prices
A. A Static Conceptual Analysis: Summary
Annex B presents a formal economic analysis which examines conceptually the implications of
alternative pricing and distribution policies for commercial food aid on market prices of the
commodity being donated (yellow maize).  The principal focus is on the effects of the official
consignee price and the number of consignees on consumer prices.  The next section evaluates
the similarities and key differences between the assumptions of these models and the
characteristics of the marketing system as it works in Mozambique.  These two analyses -20  Defined as the difference between the minimum profit they would require to participate and
the profit they actually earned.
21  This is not to say they do not earn profits.  Recall that rents are defined as "excess" profits -
profit beyond what the consignee requires to stay in business.
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abstract, formal, and simplified in this section, less abstract and more "realistic" in section B -
allow important generalizations to be made regarding the best policy for the pricing and
distribution of food aid.  The reader with an interest in formal economic analysis should read
Annex B before continuing.  This section will present a summary of the analytical results from
the Annex.
The static models begin with the simplest "base case" in which we examine a single time
period and assume that the market structure among consignees and lower in the system
(primarily informal wholesalers and retailers) is perfectly competitive.  This first case also
assumes that there is no source of supply beyond food aid.  Each case then introduces selected
complications, to more closely approximate the real world situation.  The second case
introduces the presence of an outside source of supply.  This is meant to capture the white
maize trade with Swaziland as well as domestic white maize production.  Both are influential
on Maputo prices during normal levels of supply.  Case three is a variant of case two,
assuming an infinitely elastic outside supply as opposed to case two's finitely elastic supply. 
Finally, case four keeps the assumption of an outside source of supply (finitely elastic), but
assumes a monopoly market structure at the consignee level for yellow maize in Mozambique.  
The analyses show that as long as the quantity of food aid offered by donors is less than what
consignees will accept at the official consignee price, this price has no effect on retail prices. 
This result holds whether there are "many" or "few" consignees.   The consignees capture a
rent
20, and the retail price is determined entirely by the quantity placed on the market.  This
generally describes the situation in Mozambique prior to late 1992, when consignees accepted
all the grain that arrived and would likely have taken more had it been offered.  
If the quantity of food aid exceeds what consignees will accept at the fixed price, consignees
do not accept all the grain being offered, and they do not earn any rents.
21  In this case, the
official price does affect the retail price, through its effect on the quantity of food aid the
consignees agree to purchase.  If donors and government increase the official price,
consignees will accept less volume, and the market price will rise.  If instead the official price
is decreased, consignees will accept more volume, and the market price will fall.  The clear
indicator that the quantity of food aid offered exceeds consignee demand would be food aid
supplies left in storage, or not accepted off the boat by consignees.  This became a serious
problem beginning in late 1992, with the very large arrivals of commercial grain, and leakage
of emergency grain onto the market.  Thus, since about November 1992, this situation
captures an important characteristic of the food aid market. 
A final result is that, for a given official price, a group of competitive consignees is more likely
to accept all the food aid than is a monopoly consignee or a small number of collusive
consignees.  Stated slightly differently, a group of competitive consignees will accept more
grain at a given price than will a monopoly consignee.  Thus, on average, supply to the market23
will be lower, and retail prices higher, when there is a monopoly over food aid at the
consignee level than when sufficient consignees have access to make the system competitive. 
This has important implications for the design of a distribution scheme.
B. An Empirical View
The type of analysis summarized above and presented in Annex B has strengths and
weaknesses in developing an understanding of real world problems and potential solutions to
them.  The primary strength is that it allows one to focus on only those characteristics deemed
most germane to the problem.  While the advantages of such a tight focus can be considerable,
the disadvantage is that the real world is never so simple as the model, and the complications
that the model omits may be important to an effective understanding of the problem. 
In the specific case analyzed here, there are two strengths of the approach.  First, the informal
marketing sector in the southern area of the country (where most commercial food aid is
destined) is highly competitive.  Thus, the models' assumption of a competitive market
structure beyond the level of consignee is probably appropriate.  The second strength is that
monopoly and near monopoly conditions at the level of consignee have been created in the
past.  This has occurred when the EEC delivered grain to only two consignees, only one of
whom operates directly in Maputo.  Also, prior to 1992, USAID delivered to a very restricted
set of consignees.  Thus, case 4 in Annex B captures the essence of these situations.  
There are, however, at least two important limitations of the models.  First, and most
importantly, they assume that all traders have perfectly accurate information about all relevant
aspects of the market.  Second, the models assume that the consignee price is knowable with
certainty.  Regarding the consignee price, we know that the effective price paid is in fact not
easy to determine.  First, the official terms of the sale often vary: how much does the
consignee pay up-front?, what interest rate is he charged if he pays less than 100%?, how
many days of grace is he granted?, if not required to pay 100% up-front, is full payment ever
made?  These are some of the questions that can strongly influence the effective price the
consignee pays.  In general, these complications will result in an effective price below the
official price, increasing consignee rents when food aid supplies are scarce or decreasing losses
when supplies are excessive.
Regarding market information (the first limitation of the models), there are four salient
characteristics in the Mozambican context where informational limitations may have serious
effects:
1. Current and future food aid shipments, 
2. Current and future prices and volumes of white maize grain and meals out of
Swaziland and Mozambique, 
3. Current and future volumes of emergency grain being diverted to the market, and 
4. The effects on consumer demand of the emergency grain which remains off the market
(being consumed by those who received it).  
Poor information regarding the first point is a problem endemic to the market.  Most traders
below the level of consignee have little or no idea that a ship is arriving until very shortly24
before it does arrive, and many might never be certain of the quantity of grain on the ship. 
Others, principally the large consignees scheduled to receive the grain, have relatively good
timing and quantity information, at least about the next shipment.  Economists refer to this
situation of unequally distributed information as the problem of asymmetric information.  It is
a problem which plagues markets throughout the Third World.
Not enough is known about market fluctuations in Swaziland and South Africa.  If these are
great, they can contribute to uncertainty in Mozambique, due to the importance of the white
maize meal trade between the countries.
Information about the third and fourth points is also poor, and has become a serious problem
since late 1992.  Consignees and other traders have had no way of predicting how much
emergency grain would appear for sale, and have probably been unable to make any more than
a very gross estimate of quantities which have actually arrived on the market.  Other
consignees selling grain or meal outside of Maputo have had no way of knowing how
emergency grain distribution would affect their business until they actually experienced sharp
drop-offs in demand.  
These informational problems have two key effects in the real world of Mozambique.  First,
consignees may underestimate both the volume of emergency grain leaking on to the market
and the effect of delivered emergency grain on demand for their product.  As a result, they
may accept "too much" grain from commercial food aid shipments, leading to a market
clearing price below that needed to cover costs and give an acceptable profit.  This is clearly
what has happened since late 1992 (see Chapter III, section E).  The cost to the system of this
situation is not just financial losses to some consignees, but rather the generalized uncertainty
that it creates for all traders.  In the end, consumers generally pay for this uncertainty in the
form of higher prices and less reliable supplies.
Second, informational asymmetries may allow some well informed consignees to manipulate
the market, creating difficulties for less well informed traders further up the system.  See
MOA/MSU Research Team (1993, pp. 33-35) for a detailed description of one incident of
apparent market manipulation.
C. Synthesis of Implications for Retail Prices
Upon further reflection, results of the static analysis appear fairly robust.  That analysis gave
two counterintuitive results.  One was that consignee price has no effect on retail prices unless
the amount of food aid being offered is more than consignees are willing to accept at the
official price.  The second result, which follows directly from the first, was that delivering all
grain to a single consignee (creating a monopoly in food aid) would not result in prices above
those with "many" consignees if the quantity of food aid supplied was less than what the
consignee was willing to accept at the official price.  This result was qualified by the statement
that a monopolist would accept less, resulting in higher market prices, than would a group of
competitive consignees.  
The "real world" analysis of the previous section strengthens the first result.  When supplies of
food aid become large, uncertainty regarding the effects of emergency food aid supplies means25
that consignees may accept "too much" commercial grain, and market prices may fall below
the level indicated by the official price.  Thus, in practice, the official price in this circumstance
will only influence the market price, albeit strongly, rather than directly determining it.  The
second counterintuitive result of the static analysis is weakened but not eliminated by the
analysis in section B.  In the real markets of Maputo, informational asymmetries mean that a
monopoly consignee will be in a better position to manipulate prices upwards than would a
relatively large group of consignees.  Nevertheless, the monopoly consignee faces an
unavoidable fact: another boat will be arriving at some time in the future, and the consignee
needs to have largely sold his grain by the time that boat arrives.  This effectively reduces the
control the monopolist can exert over the quantity flowing to market.  Because of imperfect
and asymmetric information, however, the monopolist does maintain some, possibly
significant, ability to manipulate the market.26
Figure 1. Commercial food aid arrivals and maize grain prices in Maputo, March 1990-
June 199322 Note that these are monthly average prices which smooth out some of the variation.  The
lowest price observed in Mucoriama Market during January 1992 was 313 while the highest
price during April 1992 was 1067, representing an increase of 241%.
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The record of yellow and white maize price movements since early 1990, summarized in
Figure 1, confirms the essential results of these analyses.  Specifically it shows that a) food aid
arrivals strongly influence yellow maize grain price movements, b) consignee prices have little
effect on these prices, and c) white maize prices are strongly influenced by yellow maize
prices, and thus by food aid arrivals.  
Figure 1 plots Maputo retail prices of yellow and white maize grain along with consignee
prices and commercial food aid arrivals of yellow maize grain since March 1990.  Comparison
of two one-year periods - July 1990 to July 1991, and July 1991 to July 1992 - provides
simple graphical evidence of the strong relationship between food aid arrivals and prices for
yellow maize.  During the first period, food aid shipments were evenly spaced over the months
and there were no large increases in the prices for white and yellow maize.  The second period
(July 1991-July 1992) was quite different.  From August 1991 through October 1991, there
were no commercial food aid arrivals and the prices rose rapidly from 373 meticais per kg to
575 meticais per kg, a rise of 54% in only two months.  In November and December, almost
60,000 metric tons of yellow maize food aid arrived and the price returned to a low of 323
meticais per kg.  Another period ensued from January through April 1992, during which no
food aid arrived and no regional production was being harvested.  The result was a price climb
of 126% (from 323 meticais to 729 meticais per kg
22).  The negative consequences of such
price fluctuations are felt by the urban poor, who are dependent upon yellow maize as the least
costly consumption staple, and who have little savings or credit with which to smooth their
consumption in the face of such large fluctuations in price.  28
Since late 1992, the previous pattern of sharp price rises associated with interruptions in
commercial food aid arrivals has not repeated itself, despite the lack of any significant
commercial food aid arrivals since January.  The price for yellow maize has remained relatively
stable around 425 meticais per kg, historically low in real terms.  To understand this difference
in behavior between the two periods, one must recall the very large amounts of emergency
food aid which arrived on top of the historically large amounts of commercial aid at the end of
1992 and beginning of 1993 (Section III.F.).  The apparently unprecedented leakages from the
emergency program during this time are the key reason that prices have remained so low for
so long.  As a measure of how low these prices are in real terms, note that the last time
Maputo had sustained prices of around 400 MT/kg was two to three years ago, from mid-
1990 through mid-1991.  Since that time, accumulated inflation has reached or exceeded
100%.  Thus, in real terms, yellow grain prices have not been this low since data collection
first began in March 1990.
Consignee prices have apparently had little effect on consumer prices.  Without question, retail
prices fluctuate over the short term independently of consignee prices, which are fixed for long
stretches of time.  Over the longer term, it also does not appear that consignee prices have had
a noticeable effect: these prices have approximately doubled since January 1991, yet retail
prices are at levels last seen from mid-1990 through mid-1991.  Furthermore, these retail price
levels, only about 25% above prices paid by consignees, leave no room for normal consignee
profits.  
These results are consistent with the theoretical analyses above.  Since demand for commercial
food aid grain was not satisfied until late 1992, consignee price should have had no effect on
retail prices.  Since late 1992, when we suggest that commercial arrivals probably were
sufficient to satisfy consignee demand, prices have fallen further than they otherwise would
have, due to large leakage of emergency grain into markets.  If this emergency grain had not
come on to the market in such large volumes, the consignee price during this time may have
placed a floor under retail prices.
In analyzing the effects on consumer prices of the potential movement to import parity pricing
of yellow maize grain food aid for commercial sale, one key piece of information is the level of
margins which would be seen in the system if it were working competitively.  In the context of
our previous analysis, another way of asking this is what the margin would be between
consignees and consumers in Maputo if a group of competitive consignees were receiving just
the amount of food aid they wanted, given the price they are charged.  This is not an easy
question to answer, since there is no way of directly determining when, if ever, demand and
supply of food aid were in balance.  Nevertheless, we suggest that September and October
1992 may have been such a time.  As we have argued, prior to this time food aid was nearly
always under-supplied: consignees were probably earning excess profits (rents), and would
have taken more grain had it been available.  July 1992 was the last month of a seven month
period in which only one ship had arrived, and prices had been highly unstable.  In August,
over 65,000 MT arrived and prices began to fall.  They reached a low in September, and
changed little in October.  It is not until after November 1992 that food aid became clearly
over-supplied to the market, as much grain was being left in government storage warehouses
to spoil.23  ($150/mt)(MT4500/$)/(1000kg/mt)=675 MT/kg.  Note that the market exchange rate at
the time of this report was rising rapidly.
24  This is a maximum estimate of retail prices.  As the consignee price of yellow maize
increases, the percentage margin earned by all traders might fall.
25  We have not calculated deflated prices because of the difficulty of obtaining a reliable price
index.  Nevertheless, estimates of inflation range between 30% and 50% per year.
26  Essentially, this means that there is only a 0.1% probability that these two series are in fact
uncorrelated.  See Annex C for a similar analysis using detrended data.  Results are very
similar, with a correlation coefficient of 0.66, also highly significant.
29
So if we accept that September-October 1992 represents a time when supply and demand of
yellow maize food aid was in approximate balance in Maputo, we find that the mean retail
price of yellow grain was 487 MT/kg while the consignee price averaged 296 MT/kg (262 in
September and 329 in October).  This shows a total gross margin of 191 MT, or
approximately 65% ((487-296)/296).  Currently, a CIF price for yellow maize in Maputo
might be around $150/mt.  At current exchange rates, this comes to approximately 675
MT/kg
23, appropriately viewed as a consignee level price.  Applying our 65% margin, we
calculate that a consignee price of 675 MT/kg would result in a retail price of about 1,100
MT/kg, if consignee demand were just satisfied at the 675 MT/kg price
24.  As a point of
comparison, in real terms this price would be similar to market prices which prevailed from
mid-1990 through mid-1991, when frequent small arrivals of yellow maize kept prices
relatively stable.  Thus, while this price would represent more than a doubling of current
prices, it would not be unusually high in real terms.
25
A final issue is the effect of food aid arrivals on white maize prices.  This issue is quite
important, as a major objective for the country over the next several years is to increase
dramatically its production and marketing of white maize grain.  Referring again to Figure 1,
we see that through July 1992, retail white maize price fluctuations were highly correlated
with those of yellow maize, showing a simple correlation coefficient of 0.77, significant at
0.001
26.  But from August 1992 through April 1993, these two prices separate, as shown by
the statistically insignificant correlation coefficient of -0.089.  This was a period of extreme
scarcity of white maize products due to the drought that affected most of Southern Africa. 
Since the relatively normal domestic white maize harvest began in April 1993, the price series
have returned to a more normal relationship.  
Thus, it is clear that, under normal supply conditions for each grain, the quantity of yellow
maize arriving on the market has a very strong influence on retail prices of white maize. 
Whether these retail price signals are then transmitted through the system to the producer level
is an important empirical question which will be examined in the next section.27  For an alternative analysis of the producer incentive effects of yellow maize food aid, see
Dorosh, et al. (1993).
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IV. Effects on Producer Prices
As noted in Chapter Two, section II, potential disincentive effects on producers have
historically been one of the most contentious issues involving food aid.  Despite this, Jones
(1989) notes that "there is little quantification of the costs of discincentives effects of food aid
...; none of the studies of programme and/or emergency aid attempt it" (p. 2).  This section,
while not arriving at a formal quantification of these costs, will examine systematically the
factors that determine whether there will be an effect, and how large that effect will be.  
A. A Static Conceptual Analysis: Summary
27
Annex E presents a graphical economic analysis of the effects of yellow maize food aid
arrivals in urban areas of Mozambique on production of white maize in rural areas of the
country.  The analysis demonstrates that these effects depend on three key parameters: the
elasticity of supply of white maize out of Swaziland and Zimbabwe (the relevant world market
for Mozambique), the elasticity of domestic supply of white maize, and the cross-price
elasticity of demand (the degree of substitutability) between yellow and white maize.  The
effects of yellow maize food aid on domestic white maize production are more negative as
world market supplies become less elastic, as domestic supplies become more elastic, and as
the degree of substitutability between yellow and white maize increases (i.e., as their cross-
price elasticity becomes more positive).  
In addition to these demand and supply parameters, a comprehensive assessment of the
production incentive effects of yellow maize food aid must evaluate the performance of food
markets in Mozambique in two other respects.  First, are spatially separate food markets at a
given level in the system (e.g., at retail) integrated through the flow of product in response to
price incentives?  If they are, then price changes at this level in urban markets will be passed-
on quickly and completely to rural markets.  The analysis in Annex E assumed, for ease of
exposition, that Mozambican markets are integrated, with prices between the two areas
differing only by a fixed marketing margin.  In fact, markets may be more or less integrated,
and the degree of integration will determine to what extent changes in the urban price of white
maize, induced by yellow maize food aid arrivals, are passed-on to rural areas.  Section B
below examines the empirical record in Mozambique to determine to what extent markets
show evidence of integration, and to analyze the factors that may affect market integration in
the future.
Second, are markets in a given geographical area well-connected across levels in the
marketing system?  In other words, will fluctuations in price at the retail or wholesale level be
transmitted to the producer level?  If so, how quickly and completely will this transmission
take place?  If price transmission to the farm level is quick and complete, then farmers will be
vulnerable to any retail or wholesale price reductions caused by increased food aid arrivals. 
To the extent that prices are not effectively transmitted in this manner, farmers will be
insulated from these potentially negative effects.  This issue of "price transmission" was31
ignored in the analysis of Annex E.  Only one level of the system was examined, implicitly
assuming that price transmission to other levels is strong.
Finally, the results from the analysis in Annex E depend on the initial assumption that rural
Mozambique would export to urban areas under normal post-war circumstances.  If rural
areas would not supply the cities even under these improved conditions, then much more food
aid could be brought into urban areas without affecting incentives for rural production.  Are
rural areas currently supplying significant volumes of white maize to Mozambican cities?  Is
there reason to believe that these volumes would be greatly increased in a peace-time setting? 
Again, we must look at the empirical record.
B. An Empirical View
This next section will use empirical information developed over the past three years in the
MOA/MSU Food Security Project to address four questions:
1. Is urban Mozambique an important market for white maize from rural Mozambique? 
If the answer is "no", then the importance of the final three questions is greatly
reduced.  We suggest that the answer is "yes".
2. Is there reason to believe that yellow maize food aid arrivals will depress white maize
prices in the port in which they arrive?  This is the issue of the degree of
substitutability (quantified by the cross-price elasticity of demand) between white and
yellow maize.  If the two products are very weak substitutes, then yellow maize food
aid will have little effect on white maize prices, and questions 3 and 4 below lose
importance.  We suggest that among the large number of poor urban consumers,
these products are and will continue to be important substitutes.
3. If yellow maize volumes do affect white maize prices in the port city in which they
arrive, will these price effects be passed-on to farmers?  This question involves the two
issues of market integration and price transmission.  We suggest that market
integration is relatively strong in some areas, weak in others, but likely to
improve steadily throughout the country.  We conclude that price transmission is
still relatively weak throughout the country, but that this too is expected to improve. 
As each improves, the effects of yellow maize food aid arrivals on urban prices of
white maize will be increasingly passed-on to farmers. 
4. Finally, if these price effects are passed-on, what will be the response of domestic
production and imports of white maize?  In other words, what will be the relative
declines in the volume of each when demand for white maize in Mozambique falls? 
This question relates to the issue of the elasticity of supply in world and domestic
white maize markets.  We suggest that the relevant world market for white maize
to Mozambique is Swaziland and Zimbabwe, and that supply from these two
countries is inelastic.  This unresponsive world market supply will increase the
negative effects on domestic production of any decrease in demand for white maize
caused by increases in yellow maize food aid.  In other words, we suggest that any32
decline in total white maize demand in urban Mozambique is likely to be borne
primarily by domestic production, not by imports.
1. Is Urban Mozambique an Important Export Market for Rural
Mozambique?
Knowledge of maize movements within the country and interviews with formal sector
armazenistas and informal wholesalers both indicate that rural Mozambique currently ships
white maize to the cities, but that the volume of trade would be greater if yellow maize were
absent or if it carried a higher price.  Lower transport costs would also increase the shipments. 
SIMA researchers can document shipments of white maize from Cabo Delgado to Maputo and
Beira, Nampula to Maputo, Manica to Maputo and Beira, and Gaza and Inhambane to
Maputo (see Figure 2 for a map of Mozambique).
During late 1991 and early 1992, MOBEIRA (the industrial maize mill in Beira) purchased
approximately 1,800 MT of white maize from Cabo Delgado province.  CIM of Maputo
purchased 4,800 MT during the same time, also from Cabo Delgado.  In both instances, the
mills indicated that they had purchased white grain only because they risked running
out of stocks of yellow maize grain from food aid (Weber, et al., 1992).  It seems
reasonable to suggest that these firms would have purchased larger quantities of white maize
over the past years had they never had access to yellow maize.  Other traders make the same
contention.  Of five armazenistas interviewed in Maputo during September 1993, four
indicated that they would like to purchase domestic white maize in the future, but that they
were not currently doing so.  All four cited the very low prices of yellow maize as one key
reason for their lack of interest in white maize.  Most also made reference to the high cost of
transport from northern and central provinces to Maputo.
Despite these problems, some armazenistas are purchasing domestic white maize.  In August,
a trader in Nampula sold 2,000 MT of grain FOB Nacala for shipment to Maputo.  In Maputo,
one of the interviewed armazenistas was purchasing white grain for sale in Maputo.  Finally,
informal traders in Bazuca market are purchasing white maize from northern Maputo, Gaza
and Manica provinces.  The total quantity, however, is lower than it would be if more of the
large armazenistas were involved, and low yellow maize prices are one key reason that they
are not.
Observation and interviews on the retail level support the idea that low yellow maize prices
are reducing the market for white maize.  Prior to the drought, one typically found significant
volumes of whole white meal in Maputo and Beira markets.  This product has been entirely
absent from Maputo during 1993, and was found during only four weeks in Beira.  This
despite the presence of white grain (though in relatively small volume) in both cities during the
entire year.  When retail vendors were asked why they were not purchasing white grain,
having it custom-milled into whole meal, and selling that meal, the most common response
was that there was no market for the product, due to the low prices of yellow meal.  Traders
have found that the low price of yellow grain and meal has eliminated this once important
market niche.  Consumers who can afford white meal prefer to purchase the grain and hand-
pound it into a superior product.33
Figure 2. Map of Mozambique (provinces and selected districts)34
In sum, there is ample evidence that rural areas of Mozambique have in the past and are
currently supplying urban Mozambique with white maize.  There is also strong reason to
believe that this supply would be significantly greater if yellow maize were not in such
abundant supply and if its price were not so low.  Finally, as the rural marketing system
improves with investment in roads, rehabilitation of rural stores, and increased ability of
farmers to store product, trade between the rural and urban areas should increase.  This is one
key element of the long-term development challenge that Mozambique faces.
Is urban Mozambique a "large" market for rural Mozambique?  Stated differently, will changes
in demand in urban areas lead to significant changes in prices and production in rural areas?  If
total consumption in urban areas is only a small proportion of that in rural zones, then these
urban demand shifts may be of little importance for farmers.  Available evidence indicates that
throughout the country, but especially in the south, urban areas are large enough to be
significant markets for rural areas.  In the south, Dorosh, et al. (1993) estimate total
consumption of maize (white and yellow) of 115,000 MT in Maputo/Matola, and 130,000 MT
in rural areas.  Per capita consumption of yellow and white maize combined is estimated to be
higher in urban than in rural areas (cassava makes-up the difference in rural areas). 
Furthermore, marketed surplus in rural areas is a small proportion of total production. 
Demand in Maputo as a proportion of this marketed surplus is certainly very large.  As a
result, changes in demand in the city can have major effects on production for the market in
rural areas.  Since a long-term development goal is to integrate rural producers into the
national economy, it would seem important not to undercut the principal market for the
country's basic staple.
It is worth noting that during May through October 1993, no white maize entered Maputo
from Swaziland, despite the good harvest in that country and in South Africa.  Thus, rural
Mozambique has been the only supplier of white maize to the city.  Beira in the center and
Nampula in the north are also large population centers which have the potential to significantly
affect production incentives in the rural areas.  This will be increasingly true as the marketing
systems improve and pass-on price effects more completely from urban to rural areas.
2. Are White and Yellow Maize Substitutes in Consumption?
The degree of substitution in consumption between yellow and white maize in Southern Africa
is a complex economic and social issue.  For many years governments in the region held the
two prices nearly equal through a highly controlled marketing system.  Quantities of each
product were also administratively allocated, with yellow maize typically being assigned to
livestock feed uses.  Under these conditions, consumers clearly prefer white maize, since its
official price is equal to that of yellow, and since in practice yellow is not even available for
human consumption and has come to be associated with animal feed.  
In recent years, these marketing systems for white and yellow maize have begun to change, in
some cases quite rapidly.  Official policy has in some cases introduced price differentials
between the two products, and yellow grain and flours have begun to be found on the market,
allowing consumer preferences to influence and react to market-determined price differentials
between yellow and white products.  Nowhere in the region 28  Based on the simple correlation coefficient of 0.77 reported in section III.C. of this chapter
(0.77
2=0.59).  From the detrended analysis in Annex C, we get an R
2 of 0.43, equivalent to a
correlation coefficient of 0.66.  Thus, correcting for positive trends in each series does not
(continued...)
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has market availability of yellow maize been greater than in Mozambique.  Since 1990, yellow
maize grain and various types of yellow meal have been readily available in informal markets. 
During late 1991 and early 1992, the poorest consumers in Maputo allocated 15% of their
total household budgets to yellow maize in its various forms.  No other staple had such a high
budget share among the poor.
Recall from section I of this chapter that there are essentially three kinds of maize meals on the
market (with some quality variation within each).  Hand-pound meals are generally
considered to be of the highest quality and carry the highest price.  They are typically
produced only with white grain.  De-germed (or refined) meals are produced with both
white and yellow grain in larger scale industrial mills.  These meals are less preferred than
hand pound meals, but are preferred to  whole (or unrefined) meals.  The latter are also
produced with both white and yellow grain, but in small local hammer mills, and always carry
the lowest price.  Thus, consumers preferences are defined over color and processing
characteristics.  In general, more refined meals are preferred to less refined meals, and white
color is preferred to yellow.  Refined yellow meals may be preferred to whole white meals, but
unambiguously, hand-pound white meal is most preferred, and whole yellow is least preferred. 
In a market setting, of course, the effect of these preferences is to generate price differentials;
the least preferred (thus cheapest) goods may be consumed in larger volume than the more
preferred (and thus more expensive) goods, depending on market and general economic
conditions.  In Maputo and Beira, probably no maize product has been consumed in larger
volume than whole yellow meal, the least preferred good.  This has been possible due to the
availability of market-priced yellow grain, the existence of many small hammer mills, and the
large numbers of very poor residents in the cities attempting to assure adequate consumption
at minimum cost.
In evaluating substitutability between white and yellow grain, therefore, attention must be paid
not only to color but to processing differences.  While hand-pound white meal and whole
yellow meal may not be close substitutes, whole white and whole yellow meals may show very
close substitutability.  Our analysis of price movements of white and yellow maize grain, and
our knowledge of consumer behavior in Mozambique and Southern Africa in general both
suggest that white and yellow maize are likely to be close substitutes in consumption.  This
substitute relationship is likely to be especially strong for the unrefined meals of each grain.  
Figure 1 of section III.C. of this chapter shows monthly prices of white and yellow maize grain
in Maputo from March 1990 through September 1993.  As the discussion in that section
demonstrated, yellow maize grain prices have been driven largely by the volumes of
commercial yellow maize grain food aid arriving in Maputo.  That discussion also
demonstrated that the prices of the two grains moved together very closely prior to the
southern African drought of 1991/92.  In fact, the yellow maize grain price alone explains
59% of the variation in the white maize grain price from March 1990 through July 1992.
28 28(...continued)
change the conclusion of strong correlation in price movements.
29  We know that whole white meal (called mugayiwa) is commonly consumed in rural areas of
Zimbabwe.
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During the drought, the two prices moved independently, due to the extreme scarcity of white
maize caused by the drought.  
Co-movement of the two price series during periods of normal supply of each product could
be explained either by highly correlated contemporaneous supply shifts of each product, or by
strong substitution between the two, or by some combination of both factors.  Supply of white
maize to Maputo is determined primarily by seasonality of production in Swaziland and
Mozambique, while yellow maize supply is determined entirely by food aid arrivals.  The latter
have shown no stable relationship to the seasonal white maize production pattern.  Thus, we
are left with substitution in consumption as the best explanation for the close co-movement of
white and yellow maize prices in Maputo.
This conclusion is consistent with knowledge of consumer behavior in Mozambique and
southern Africa in general.  Recent research in Zimbabwe (Rubey 1992) suggests that
consumer experience with yellow maize during the years of market reform and during the
1992 drought has changed preferences among many consumers in that country.  Prices of the
two grains are no longer administratively fixed at equal levels.  Quantities available are no
longer set administratively either.  Partly as a result, yellow maize is now perceived by some
Zimbabweans, especially the poorest, to be an acceptable alternative to white maize.  These
consumers now indicate a willingness to substitute between whole white meal, the traditional
and previously lowest cost staple food, and whole yellow meal, depending on prices of the
two products.  Thus, the appearance of yellow maize grain in the country, and the processing
of that grain into whole meal at low cost, has had a direct effect on demand for white maize
among lower income consumers: whole white meal must now compete with whole yellow
meal.
The same logic can be applied to Mozambique.  Traditionally, hand-pounded white meal has
been the staple food for most consumers, especially in rural areas.  In urban areas, changed
preferences for convenience created a market for machine milled (either industrially or in small
local mills) white meals.  Prior to the drought, refined white meal from Swaziland and CIM
and whole white meal from local hammer mills were commonly found in the market.  In the
absence of yellow maize, whole white meal would be the lowest cost staple food available
to poor urban consumers (and possibly rural consumers as well, depending on
opportunity costs of time in rural areas).
29  If yellow grain were not present in the market,
consumers would have few if any alternatives to consuming whole white meal as their basic
staple.  In the current situation, with much yellow grain in the market, whole yellow meal has
displaced whole white meal as the principal staple of poor households.  Viewed from this
perspective, yellow maize in the form of whole meal can only be viewed as a substitute for
white maize among consumers, and thus a competitor with domestically produced white
maize.30  The analysis which follows uses data from the MOA/MSU SIMA.  The SIMA does not
operate in Tete and Niassa, so these provinces are not considered in the analysis.  Manica and
Sofala are considered only in the market integration analysis; district level coverage in these
areas has given insufficient price observations at the producer level to allow fruitful analysis of
price transmission. 
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The presence of yellow maize has brought large benefits to consumers, especially the poorest. 
By providing an option even cheaper than whole white meal, the real income of those
choosing to consume whole yellow meal has been increased.  Eliminating this option would
not be in the interest of these consumers.  Thus, the question is not whether or not yellow
maize should be available, but rather in what volumes and at what cost.
3. How effective is Market Integration and Price Transmission in
Mozambican Food Markets?
Previous analysis of market price data gives reason to believe that levels of market integration
and price transmission might be different for the south of the country as compared to the
central and northern regions (Tschirley and Varela 1993).  Thus, the analysis that follows is
done separately for each.  Southern provinces are Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane.  Central
provinces are Sofala, Manica and Zambezia, while northern provinces are Nampula and Cabo
Delgado.
30  Insufficient farmer price data in the central provinces will limit us to an analysis of
market integration in that region.
Southern Provinces: Previous analysis has demonstrated that southern markets show
increasing signs of effective spatial integration at the retail level (MOA/MSU Research Team,
1993; Tschirley and Varela 1993).  This integration is a result of substantial trade flows in
response to price differentials, effected by both formal sector armazenistas and informal
traders.  Not all markets in the region are well integrated.  Among those monitored by the
SIMA, price movements in Vilanculos still appear to be relatively independent of Maputo and
other southern markets.  This is to be expected, since the very poor quality of the road
between Inhambane city and Vilanculos makes trade difficult.  There are undoubtedly other
markets in the region that are relatively unconnected with Maputo because of poor roads. 
Nonetheless, the road system is being rapidly improved, and previous experience indicates that
market integration should continue to strengthen as this happens.  Thus, the spatial integration
assumption of the previous section seems appropriate.  While many small markets are not well
integrated, the principal markets are, and other markets are expected to follow.  This implies
that any retail price effects in Maputo from the arrival of food aid can be expected to be felt
within a short period of time (likely less than one week) at the retail level in most areas of
Gaza and Inhambane.38
Figure 3. White Maize Grain Prices, Maputo and Chokwe (Jan-Sep 1993)39
Figure 5. White Maize Grain Prices, Maputo and Homoine (Jan-Sep 1993)
Will the marketing system in these provinces then transmit this price effect down to the
producer level?  Are markets as well integrated over levels of the system as they are over
space?  Data limitations preclude a conclusive answer to this question at this time. 
Available evidence, however, indicates that price transmission from retail to producer levels in
the southern provinces is uneven.  In other words, price transmission may be relatively strong
at some times and in some areas, but quite weak at other times or in other areas.  Figures 3
through 5 show producer and retail prices of white maize grain in Chokwe (province of Gaza),
Homoine, and Massinga (both in the province of Inhambane), from January through
September 1993.  Each figure also shows the retail price in Maputo.  In each district, retail
prices show some tendency to move with retail prices in Maputo.  This tendency is strong in
Massinga, and less strong but still apparent in Homoine and Chokwe.  This reflects the
generally effective spatial integration of retail markets in the southern region of the country.  If
price transmission from retail to producer levels were also strong, one would expect district
producer prices to follow a pattern similar to that of district retail prices, though always at a
lower level.  This pattern is quite apparent in Massinga.  When retail prices in Maputo and
Massinga were high prior to the harvest, producer prices were also high.  As retail prices fell,
so did producer prices (though more rapidly), and all three then stabilized beginning around
late March.  The pattern is also apparent, though less strong, in Chokwe.  Producer prices
hovered around Mt 1,000/kg prior to the harvest, when retail prices were also high.  As retail
prices fell, so did producer prices.  Thus, price transmission in Massinga and Chokwe appears
to have been good during this period.  In Homoine, price transmission appears to have been
quite weak.  This is best illustrated by the very low producer prices even when retail prices
were high in February.  40
Figure 6. Retail White Maize Grain Prices in Beira, Manica and Chimoio (Jan-Sep,
1993)
Overall, available evidence gives reason to expect that price transmission will continue to
strengthen in the southern area of the country.  The spatial integration of many markets in this
region proceeded very quickly once price controls and movement restrictions were eliminated. 
Price transmission has followed, though at a slower pace, as traders have entered the system at
the producer level to compete with existing lojistas (many of whom enjoyed previous
monopolies).  With peace, further entry of traders at the producer level, better capitalization of
existing traders, and increased knowledge and understanding among traders and farmers of the
system in which they operate, price transmission from retail to producer levels should become
more effective.  As a result, the implications of the static analysis of the effects of yellow
maize food aid on white maize producer prices largely hold: food aid can have strong effects
on producer prices by reducing the size of the principal "export" market (Maputo) available to
the southern provinces.
Central Provinces:  Lack of sufficient producer price data precludes an analysis of price
transmission in this region.  Retail data for Beira, Manica and Chimoio, however, indicate that
market integration appears to be relatively strong, at least along the Beira corridor.  This is to
be expected, given that this area had for some years prior to the peace accord been relatively
safe for travel, and the main road had been maintained.  Figure 6 demonstrates that retail white
maize prices in Manica and Chimoio have followed very similar patterns, being quite high from
January into March, then falling through May and remaining low since that time.  Beira has
shown greater variability, but has followed the same general pattern.  Interestingly, the gross
margin between the internal markets and Beira has been stable and quite low during the last
seven weeks of the period analyzed.  Prices in Beira during August and September were 27%31  See Tschirley and Varela (1993) for a discussion of the weak spatial market integration
observed in Ribaué and other districts of Nampula as late as April 1993.
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above those in Manica, and 22% above those in Chimoio.  It should be noted that market
integration outside of the corridor may be less strong than within the corridor, due to poor
infrastructure and a shorter history of trade.  Currently, neither the SIMA nor any other
organization collects prices in towns outside of the corridor, so that such an analysis is not
possible.
Northern Provinces: Though reliable data on marketed quantities is not available, it is clear
from repeated observation and study that total marketed volumes of maize (combined white
and yellow) in the north are lower than volumes in the south.  This is due to the presence for
several years of large volumes of yellow maize food aid (commercial and emergency) in
southern markets.  In addition, the population concentration in the south has supported active
trade in rice, wheat flour, sugar, beans, and other commodities.  The volume of trade in these
commodities has been much lower in the north.  As a result, the marketing system in the north,
including the number of traders, and especially the number of new entrants in the informal
sector, is significantly less developed than in the south.  Thus, neither spatial market
integration nor price transmission has been as strong in the recent past in the northern
provinces as in the south.  Figures 7 and 8 show retail and producer prices of white maize
grain in Ribaué and Monapo, both in the province of Nampula, accompanied by Nampula city
retail prices.  Roads from each of these districts to Nampula are open and used by traders, and
are complemented by a rail line used by farmers and informal sector traders. 
Spatial market integration between Ribaué and Nampula, as suggested by the relative
movement of retail prices in each location, appears to have improved dramatically during this
harvest season.
31  Beginning in early April, retail prices in Ribaué have followed a pattern very
similar to that in Nampula.  Also as expected, prices in Ribaué, the production zone, are below
those in Nampula, which is known to receive grain from Ribaué and nearby districts.  SIMA
researchers have documented continual trade flows between Ribaue and Nampula city, and so
are confident that the similarity of price movements in the two areas are not the result of
similar seasonality in production without actual trade flows.  Integration between Nampula
and Monapo is not so apparent, with retail prices in Monapo showing very little fluctuation.  42
Figure 7. White Maize Grain Prices, Nampula and Ribaue (Jan-Sep 1993)43
Producer prices in the province of Nampula are very "sticky" around the official minimum
price.  This pattern is a continuation of what had been observed previously, as early as late
1990 (see MOA/MSU Research Team, 1992a).  Due to a lack of sufficient competition in
rural areas, the minimum price has been interpreted as if it were an official fixed price, and
farmers are paid only the minimum.  One should note that this result is partly due to the fact
that price information is collected among rural lojistas.  These traders were the previous
officially sanctioned buyers, they continue to enjoy a strong position in many areas, and most
have apparently not seen a need to adjust to the new policy of market prices.  Comerciantes
ambulantes, or informal sector traders, are known to pay prices more in line with perceived
supply and demand conditions.  These traders are very few and small, however, and have not
captured enough of the market to force most rural lojistas to change their behavior.  As a
result, available data and information indicates that there has been little price transmission
from retail to producer levels in Nampula province.  
If this weak price transmission continues, food aid supplies in the north may have little effect
on producer incentives; but the continuation of this pattern also implies a lack of development
in the marketing system and the continuation of a primarily subsistence orientation among
smallholders.  Clearly, the objective is to create an active and efficient marketing system
throughout the country, one in which smallholders participate actively.  Once this begins to
happen, the effects of food aid on producer incentives will grow.  Thus, in the north, the
frailty of the marketing system may at this time be a greater constraint to increased
farm production and marketed surplus than the presence of food aid.  Efforts must be
directed at improving this marketing system, being conscious of the growing effect that
food aid supplies will have as these efforts succeed.
4. How Elastic are World Supplies of White Maize to Mozambique?
We have argued in the previous three sections that there is increasing reason to believe that
large volumes of yellow maize food aid arriving in urban areas could have negative effects on
the producer price of white maize throughout the country.  The final question is what the
relative effects of any price decrease will be on white maize imports and domestic production:
which of these will absorb the greatest portion of any decrease in total consumption of white
maize?  This issue relates to question number four above: the elasticity of supply of white
maize from imports and from domestic production.
We suggest that white maize import supply to Mozambique is inelastic.  This argument is
based on three observations.  First, the world white maize market is very thin, in the sense that
only a small proportion of total production enters the market during any year (Kingsbury,
1989).  The ability of a country to procure all the supply it wants in such a market without
significantly affecting the price is limited.  Second, the volume of trade in white maize world
markets is unstable.  This is due to the concentration of trade volume which comes from
southern Africa (over 90%), and the high covariance of production across countries in this
region (Jayne, et al., 1994).  For example, from 1975 through 1983, the covariance of exports
from South Africa and Zimbabwe, the world's two largest white maize exporters, was 0.63. 
The coefficient of variation of South African exports was 0.47, while that for Zimbabwe was
0.49.  The southern Africa drought of 1992 is only the latest, albeit very severe, example of
region-wide weather disasters which drastically reduce supplies for all countries.  Thus,32  See Annex D for a more in-depth discussion of markets in Swaziland.
33  From SIMA data.  The SIMA has distinguished between imported and domestically
produced maize only for the past year.
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supplies of white maize tend to be scarce or abundant in all countries of the region at the same
time.  These factors make it very difficult for countries to use international trade to smooth
domestic production fluctuations. 
Finally, the relevant world market for white maize to Mozambique is informal trade with
Swaziland and Zimbabwe.  These markets present special conditions that increase the
inelasticity of supply.  Mozambique has not historically received significant volumes of white
maize from countries other than Zimbabwe and Swaziland (small amounts arrive periodically
from South Africa and possibly other countries of the region).  Supply to Maputo/Matola from
Swaziland is likely to be inelastic for two reasons.
32  First, the Maputo/Matola market is not
"small" relative to the Swaziland market.  The common assumption in economic analysis that
countries face an infinitely or highly elastic supply from the world market and thus are "price-
takers" is based on the idea that the market in most countries is very small relative to the
world market.  Thus, any change in quantity demanded by the country has an insignificant
effect on total demand, and thus on prices, in the world market.  This is clearly not the case in
Maputo/Matola.  The population of these cities is greater than that of Swaziland.  Total white
maize production in Swaziland varies around 80,000 metric tons, less than total consumption
in Maputo/Matola.  Swaziland must import one-third to one-half of its maize needs from
South Africa.  Approximately 90% of this maize is processed in a single mill, Swaki Mills,
which produces about 40,000 MT of refined white meal per year.  Frequent empirical
observation over the past three years indicates that the dominant non-Mozambican white
maize product in the Maputo market is the Ligugu refined white meal from the Swaki mill. 
White grain from Swaziland is found infrequently and in small quantities.  The SIMA research
team has never observed whole white meal from Swaziland in any Maputo market.  White
refined meal from South Africa also appears very infrequently and in small volume.  Thus,
world market white maize supply to Maputo is essentially limited to refined white meal from a
single mill (Swaki) in Swaziland.  In light of this, and in view of the large size of Maputo
relative to Swaziland, we conclude that supply from Swaziland is inelastic.
The second reason to expect inelastic supply is that nearly all the trade is conducted
informally.  Import duties are not paid on the border, and sales of white maize products
outside of the Customs Union (of which Mozambique is not a member) violate Swaziland's
agreement with the Union.  The trade as it is currently conducted, in small scale, is feasible for
traders and authorities are willing to overlook it.  If traders were to attempt to increase greatly
the volume of this trade, transactions costs could rapidly become prohibitive.
Zimbabwe previously supplied refined white meal and white maize grain to Beira.  However,
these products have been entirely absent from the Beira market during 1993, due to the high
prices in Zimbabwe.  Maize grain and meals from domestic production have been the only
white maize products in the market during this year
33.  If price relationships change, refined
white meal could once again begin entering Mozambique.  The primary reason to expect this
renewed supply to be inelastic is the highly controlled nature of the export marketing system in45
Zimbabwe.  Research in that country indicates that the large-scale, centralized maize milling
system which has been in place since before independence captures nearly all the marketed
maize (Jayne and Rubey, 1993).  Some unrefined white meal (mugayiwa) is produced in local
hammer mills and sold in rural markets, but these are very thin.  Moreover, the SIMA has
never detected this unrefined meal in Beira markets.  The refined meal and grain that does
arrive does so through informal channels, and expressly against Zimbabwean policy.  While
authorities have begun to liberalize internal trade, foreign trade remains controlled.
In sum, evidence indicates that world market supply of white maize to both Maputo/Matola
and Beira is inelastic.  This will force any adjustment in quantities demanded within
Mozambique on to domestic production.  This production is also likely to be relatively
inelastic, for a series of reasons, some of which are discussed in the next section.  Yet the lack
of any legal controls on maize production and marketing, plus the improvements associated
with the ending of the war, suggest that supply response in Mozambique is likely to be more
elastic than that in either Swaziland or Zimbabwe.  If this is the case, then domestic white
maize production, not imports, will carry the brunt of any reduction in internal demand caused
by increased yellow maize food aid.  Certainly as rural infrastructure and marketing systems
recuperate after the war, the supply response will become increasingly elastic, and domestic
production will be increasingly vulnerable to depressed prices.  
C. Producer Response to Price Changes
Regardless of the producer price effects that food aid has, our ultimate interest is in the
influence those price effects have on producer behavior.  The simple conclusion that higher
prices will increase production and benefit most producers, while lower prices will decrease
prices and hurt producers, is certainly true in the long run.  But in the short and medium run
the magnitude, and for some groups of farmers even the direction, of these effects cannot be
taken for granted (Eriksson, 1993; de Janvry, et al., 1992).  In other words, both theoretical
and empirical studies indicate that producers can, under certain circumstances, respond to
higher food prices with lower production; under others, they may not respond at all.
A full review of the literature and analysis of the supply response to price changes in
Mozambique is beyond the scope of this paper.  Nonetheless, two key points may be made. 
First, producers are more likely to show a very weak or negative production response to
higher prices if the non-agricultural economy in rural areas is severely underdeveloped. 
Specifically, if producers find it very difficult to purchase all the consumer goods they want,
and if they have few opportunities for off-farm work, they may reduce production as prices
rise.  Second, the immediate effect of a price rise on a producer's real income depends on that
producer's position in the market.  If the producer sells more of the product than he or she
buys (being defined as a "net seller"), a price increase will also increase real income.  If the
producer does not participate in the market, a price increase will have no direct effect on real
income.  Finally, if the producer is a "net buyer", buying more of the good than he or she sells,
an increase in the price of the good will decrease real income.
Empirical research conducted in 1991 in rural Nampula province, along with SIMA data,
shows that consumer goods were quite scarce in most markets (MOA/MSU Research Team,
1992b).  This same research shows that opportunities for off-farm labor were much more46
restricted than in most other Sub-Saharan Africa countries.  Both of these conditions suggest
the possibility of a very weak or even negative producer response to higher prices.  Clearly,
the principal reason for these conditions was the war which continued to affect farmers' lives
at the time the research was conducted.  With the ending of the war, one would expect these
conditions to improve, and for producer response to price incentives to be increasingly
positive.  In the medium and long runs, there seems little reason to doubt that this will happen. 
But large improvements in the rural economies of Mozambique will require several years. 
During that time, producer response to improved price incentives is likely to be weaker than
some might expect.  Thus, preventing maize grain food aid from entering the country at highly
subsidized prices should be viewed as part of a long-run strategy to reactivate agricultural
production.  
CHAPTER FIVE
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO QUANTITY PROGRAMMING,
PRICING, AND DISTRIBUTION
I. Introduction
Mozambique has demonstrated a sustained commitment to liberalizing its economy since it
took the first steps in that direction in 1985.  Eventually, the country's goal is to be self-reliant
in providing for its food needs.  Essentially, this means ensuring sufficient domestic supplies
through a workable combination of domestic production and commercial imports financed
largely with earned foreign exchange.  Liberalized international trade in basic foodstuffs would
be one key component of such a regime.  
Clearly, Mozambique is far from that objective at the present time.  As has been said before,
food aid, both commercial and emergency, will continue for some years to be a very significant
portion the total food supply, especially of maize.  Yet this paper has argued from the outset
that food aid can and should be used to facilitate the transition to a self-reliant, essentially
private economy, open to and effectively utilizing world markets.  Doing so requires that one
understand the essential characteristics of such an open economy, and design a food aid
program which is compatible with it.  
One of these essential characteristics is that prices on world markets are largely outside the
control of domestic traders.  In economic jargon, world market prices are "exogenous".  This
implies that domestic traders must accept these prices as given, and adjust the quantities they
demand.  If world market prices increase, they demand less; if prices fall, traders demand
more.  Prices determine quantities, not vice versa.  The key result which flows from this
characteristic is that domestic prices will track world prices for any product in which the
country participates in world markets.  If the country consistently exports, prices will
approximate the EPP.  If it consistently imports, domestic prices will move closely with the
higher (by transport and other costs) IPP.  If the country produces enough to meet its needs at
market clearing prices that are above export parity (precluding exports) but below import34  If domestic prices in such an economy move outside of the band defined by import and
export parity prices, trade will take place, thus pushing prices back into the band.
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parity (making imports unattractive), it will not participate in world markets.  In this case,
domestic prices will be free to fluctuate within the band defined by import and export parity
without regard to world price movements.  In the medium to long-run, however, prices even
in a self-sufficient country will tend to track world price movements
34.  All of this depends, of
course, on free trade in international markets.
This model of an essentially open economy, towards which Mozambique is moving, will be the
basis for evaluating the alternative approaches to quantity programming, pricing, and
distribution of food aid presented in the following sections.  The objective will be to begin
now to create a domestic grain economy which mimics as closely as possible the type of
economy which is emerging in the country.
II. Auctions
In a typical auction, a fixed quantity is offered to participants, and the highest bidder receives
the product.  Modifications can be introduced to allow several participants to share the
quantity.  In either case, the essential characteristic of the auction is that price adjusts to
quantity, rather than vice versa.  This clearly violates the condition specified above, that
quantities adjust to price.  
Yet this simple view of auctions does not capture the whole truth, if suppliers to the auction
are responsive to expected prices.  In a setting where both suppliers and demanders are
subject to market forces, suppliers have an incentive to provide more product if they expect
the price to be high.  Thus, in repeated auctions, a high price during one would induce greater
supply for the following auction, if the suppliers expected demand to remain strong.  In other
words, while quantity is not responsive to price during a single auction, it can be over repeated
auctions.  Thus, auctions in a setting where suppliers are responsive to price could satisfy the
above requirement.
In the context of commercial food aid, however, only demanders are in a market setting. 
Suppliers (donors) receive no payment for the product, and the price at which it sells thus
provides them with no incentive.  For this reason, there is no reason to expect that food aid
quantities will be responsive to prices in an auction system, even over repeated auctions. 
Furthermore, there is reason to expect that food aid arrivals will continue to be irregular (see
Figure 1 for historical evidence in Mozambique) unless a system is specifically designed to
stabilize them.  Irregular arrivals that are unresponsive to price signals constitute a recipe for
highly unstable internal prices, as demonstrated by the record in Mozambique since 1990. 
Auctions would therefore not appear to be a viable option for the pricing of commercial food
aid in Mozambique.48
III. Fixed Price Systems
In contrast to an auction, in which price is forced to adjust to the quantity being offered, the
concept behind the kind of fixed price systems discussed in this section is that quantities will
adjust to a pre-announced price.  This process is similar to what happens in a commercial
import system, since traders are unable to affect the world market price.  They must accept
this as given, and adjust the quantity they purchase based on the price.  As long as they do so
effectively, final prices within the country will be very similar to world market prices.  A major
goal of a fixed price commercial food aid system in Mozambique is to keep domestic prices in
line with world prices, or world price trends.  For this to happen, mechanisms must be
developed to ensure that demand for the commercial food aid is satisfied at whatever
price is applied.  This is probably the key requirement of the system.  If this is done
successfully, it would result in a major decrease in price instability.  It should also improve
incentives for domestic production of white maize, as world prices have been far higher than
consignee prices over at least the past three years.
A word about terminology, specifically the term "fixed price", is in order.  In any economic
system, someone or some system must fix prices.  In a country with free international trade,
the world market does this.  Yet the market alone cannot do so for food aid, since aid is not
transacted on world markets.  Thus, someone must fix a price.  The point of the following
sections will be to show how to do so with due regard to world markets.
A. Import Parity Pricing: The Pros and Cons of the World Price as a Guide for
Domestic Price Policy
Should yellow maize food aid prices in Mozambique be tied in some systematic way to world
market prices?  If so, how should world prices be used to calculate the domestic sales price? 
Before answering these questions, one must first ask "which world price?"  The answer
depends in part on whether the country would be an exporter or an importer on world markets
under normal conditions.  An importer would pay the IPP.  An exporting country must
compete in the relevant world market, and should thus use the EPP.  This is generally taken to
be the FOB price of the competitive world market, also adjusted for internal transport. 
In deciding which parity price to use, one must carefully consider not only the country's
current competitive position in world markets, but its likely position in the medium and long-
run.  In the short and medium run, Mozambique is clearly an importer of maize, so that the
IPP is most appropriate.  The conventional wisdom is that, as domestic production increases
after the end of the war, domestic white maize will force yellow maize out of the country's
consumption basket, and Mozambique will be a food exporter.  This would require that
surplus northern areas of the country supply the deficit south.  Yet the reality may be more
complex.  In the context of liberalized trade throughout the southern African region,
Mozambique could export white maize while importing both white and yellow maize: northern
surplus areas might supply Malawi and possibly southern Tanzania, while the deficit south
continues to purchase Swazi and South African white maize as well as domestic white maize
from the north and yellow maize from the international market to complement domestic white
supplies from Gaza and Inhambane provinces.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that,
at least for the next several years, the IPP will be the relevant world price for Mozambique.49
But this doesn't answer the question of why the world price should be used as a guide in the
first place.  Mellor (p. 288) states that "ideally, international prices reflect underlying global
supply and demand balances and hence serve as a basis for determining the comparative
advantage for agriculture in individual countries".  A more pragmatic observation is that nearly
every country needs at some time to use world markets, whether to dispose of surpluses or to
cover deficits.  If domestic prices are far removed from world prices when this need arises, the
cost of using world markets can be extremely high.  In fact it is probable that the costs will be
high; very high domestic prices will tend to create surpluses, which would have to be
subsidized to be disposed of on world markets.  Likewise, very low domestic prices lead to
deficits, and if imports are to be used to keep the price low, they too will have to be
subsidized.
Nevertheless, a plausible argument against using the world price as a guide in domestic price
policy states that the level of this price is biased downward by agricultural subsidies in
developed countries, and its movement is influenced by what are often primarily political de-
cisions in these same countries.  For this reason, the argument goes, neither world price levels
nor movements are viable guides for domestic price policy.  This argument is more effective
against the comparative advantage reasoning of Mellor than it is against the more pragmatic
consideration which followed it.
Furthermore, even assuming that Mozambique were to decide that world prices should be
used in some manner as a guide for domestic price policy, it will have to deal with a number of
difficulties in applying these prices.  One difficulty is that world prices may be more unstable
than many countries are willing to accept.  As a result, many attempt to insulate their domestic
markets to one extent or another from world price fluctuations.  Further, a country using
world prices as a guide generally desires to plan its domestic production based on long-run, or
at least medium-run, trends in those prices.  Two problems emerge in attempting to estimate
these trends.  First, short-run fluctuations in world prices often do not reflect these trends and
could unduly disrupt domestic planting decisions.  This reinforces the desire not to import all
world market fluctuations into domestic markets.  Second, agricultural subsidies in developed
countries may well cause price levels to underestimate true market clearing prices.  
A final difficulty in using world prices as a guide involves exchange rates.  For world prices
expressed in domestic currency to accurately reflect the country's opportunity cost of
producing rather than importing the commodity, they must be converted using what
economists call a "real" exchange rate.  This rate can and often does differ both from official
and market rates, and is very difficult to calculate. 
The use of world prices as guides to domestic price policy is not entirely straightforward. 
Given the arguments in favor and against their use, as well as the practical difficulties in their
application, the most balanced conclusion seems to be that  "... world price is ... a rough guide
that can neither be rigidly followed nor completely abandoned in national pricing policies"
(Mellor, p. 62).  In departing from a rigid application of world prices, insulation from their
fluctuations is most easily justified, even if the best means of obtaining this insulation are not
self-evident.  Deviation from medium or long-run world price levels is more problematic.  If a
country such as Mozambique chooses to keep domestic prices of maize below world prices,50
this should be for specific, well analyzed reasons, and likely with the eventual goal of
eliminating the difference.  
B. Which Import Parity Price?
Having accepted the principle that the IPP is a useful guide for pricing policy in Mozambique,
one is left with the question of which IPP to apply.  There are two basic options: use the
actual world market price when the ship departs from port, even if this is unusually high or
low; or use past world market prices to calculate a (more stable) trend in world prices, and
apply this trend price.  In either case, one has to decide how to convert the dollar price into
local currency.  In this section, we will draw some lessons for Mozambique from three
approaches to fixing the IPP:
a. An "average price" approach in which the dollar price varies for each ship, being equal
to the average of some fixed number of past world prices (called a "moving average"), 
b. A "step price" approach in which the dollar price is fixed for an entire marketing year
(March-February), based on the moving average series, and
c. A "market price" approach in which the dollar price is equal to the actual world market
price (without averaging) three months prior to the ship's expected date of arrival 
In all three approaches, the dollar price is converted to meticais using the market exchange
rate.  Note that all prices are FOB, U.S. gulf ports.  IPPs at the consignee level would be
approximately $50 to $60 higher, due to transport and port costs.
1. Average Price Approach
This approach uses a "moving average" of past world prices to eliminate very short-run
fluctuations while at the same time tracking world price trends.   Such an average is based on
a fixed number of observations (e.g., 60 or 36 months) and is updated each period: the latest
price is added, the earliest price is dropped, and the average is recomputed.  The moving
average can be calculated with any frequency of data, but for price policy purposes, monthly51
Figure 9. Moving averages and actual world prices of yellow maize grain, 1983-
1993
data is typically used.  Figure 9 shows two monthly moving averages, 36 and 60 months,
along with actual U.S. FOB Gulf prices of yellow maize grain between 1983 and 1993.  Each
moving average is moved forward three months, under the idea that donors may want to
announce the price to consignees with three months anticipation.  For example, the 60 month
moving average for January 1993 is equal to the average of the 60 months of prices up
through September 1992 ($100.97).  This means that in October 1992 (the earliest that
September data can be factored into the moving average), donors could have announced the
consignee price which would be in effect three months hence, in January 1993.
Note that each moving average tracks world prices, but with much less fluctuation.  Note also
that the 60 month moving average is more stable than the 36 month.  A moving average, then,
is one potentially attractive way to stabilize import prices while maintaining a systematic
relationship between what importers (or consignees) pay and actual world prices.
2. Step Price Approach
The average price approach requires one to recalculate the moving average every month and
make the result known to all consignees.  A simpler approach, which may also be easier for
traders to operate in, is to fix a single dollar price for an entire year, based on the moving
average, then update it at the end of each year.  In this way the series resembles a set of
"steps" over time.  There are many different ways to go about this, but the essential points are
to choose an appropriate marketing year, and then to announce prior to planting the consignee52
Figure 10. Fixed world prices of yellow maize grain, based on moving average of
past prices, 1983-1993
dollar price that will be in effect during that year.  The announcement prior to planting is
meant to help both traders and producers plan in an environment of reduced uncertainty.  
In Figure 10, two different step price series, based on the 36 and 60 month moving averages,
are presented with the actual U.S. Gulf FOB price.  The marketing year begins in March, with
the beginning of the white maize harvest, and runs through the following February.  The dollar
price, fixed throughout the marketing year, is made equal to the moving average through
August of the previous year.  This means that when all August data becomes available in
September, around the time that planting starts, donors and GOM can announce the dollar
consignee price which will be in effect from the following March through February.  This is
then updated every year.  
The step price series show similar characteristics to the moving averages.  They track world
prices but are much more stable.  The series based on the 36 month moving average, however,
is subject to much larger changes from year to year.  This reflects the fact that the 36 month
moving average is less stable than the 60 month, especially during periods of rapid change in
actual world prices.53
Figure 11. Sixty month moving average and fixed price approaches, converted to
meticals, January 1991 - March 1993
3. Market Price Approach
Both the average and step price approaches have been presented in dollar terms.  Each
dramatically stabilizes dollar prices while maintaining a systematic relationship between
consignee sales prices and actual world prices.  In contrast, the market price approach uses
actual world prices converted to meticais.  How do these three approaches compare once all
are expressed in meticais?  Do the first two approaches result in greater stabilization of metical
prices?
Figure 11 shows that the answer, at least for the period analyzed, is essentially "no".  This
graph has four data series.  The unstabilized metical price, the step price converted to
meticais, and the 60 month moving average price converted to meticais, are all measured on
the left hand axis.  The metical/dollar exchange rate is measured on the right hand axis.  Note
that the unstabilized metical price series shows greater month-to-month fluctuation, but
changes less from the beginning to the end of the period than do the two stabilized series. 
Over the entire period, it is difficult to argue that any of the series stabilized in dollars are less
variable in meticais than the simple metical price.  The reason for this is that the exchange rate
shows much greater fluctuation during this period than do world prices.  Thus, over the entire
period analyzed, stabilizing dollar prices removes only a small portion of the total variability in
metical prices.  54
Nevertheless, it is worth noting three sub-periods in the graph where the effect on metical
prices of stabilizing dollar prices differ:
January 1991 - July 1991:  During this period, the exchange rate is quite stable, and the two
stabilized series are in fact less variable than the simple metical price. 
August 1991 - August 1992: This is a period of rapid change in the exchange rate, and its
movement therefore dominates all the series.  The two stabilized series are no less variable
than the simple metical price during this time.
September 1992 - March 1993: Once again, the exchange rate is fairly stable during this
period, and the 60 month moving average series shows much less variability than does the
simple metical price.  The step price series does not perform as well as the moving average
during this time (it shows greater variability) because it straddles a change in the fixed dollar
price in March, resulting in a jump in the fixed metical price as well.
The important result of this analysis is that an unstable exchange rate eliminates most if not all
the benefits of stabilizing dollar prices.  If Mozambique continues to experience a highly
unstable exchange rate, there would seem to be little value in pursuing any pricing strategy
other than applying "the price of the day" in dollars and converting it to meticais.  Note also
that even without stabilization, world prices converted to meticais are significantly more stable
than market prices have been in Maputo.  The steepest price rise in Figure 11 is from March
1992 through October 1992, when metical denominated FOB maize prices rose from
approximately 210 MT/kg to 280 MT/kg.  This is a rise of 33% in seven months.  In contrast,
market prices in Maputo have on two occasions nearly doubled in the course of only three
months.  One month price changes of 20% to 25% have not been unusual.  
An alternative approach is to stabilize directly the metical prices by applying the average or
fixed price approaches to metical, rather than dollar, price series.  In practice, this would likely
not be effective, for the same reason that stabilization of dollar prices gives little metical
stabilization: the rapid devaluation of the metical.  The exchange rate is changing so rapidly
(Figure 11), that it would be necessary to bring the series up-to-date with some frequency
(e.g., every three months) using the current exchange rate, for two reasons.  First, one would
not want to create too large a gap between actual sales prices and IPPs.  Second, fixing "pan-
seasonal" prices creates serious disincentives for private sector storage, which is essential if
the marketing system in Mozambique is to continue improving its performance.  If the
exchange rate is updated frequently, however, much of the benefit of directly stabilizing
metical prices is lost, since most of their variability originates from the exchange rate.  
C. Meeting Demand
A key requirement of the fixed price system is always to meet demand for the maize grain at
the price being charged.  If this is done, then domestic price levels and variability should
approximate those found in world markets.  This happens more or less automatically in an
effective free market, as traders follow the profit motive and decide which market, domestic or
world, is most attractive to buy on or sell to and thereby force the domestic price to converge
to the world price.  Figure 1255
Figure 12. Retail import parity prices and Mucoriama market prices, Maputo
 illustrates the different path prices in Maputo may have taken from late 1990 through the
present had this been done.  The retail IPP in this figure is an approximation of what actual
retail prices would have been under a market price approach to import parity pricing of yellow
maize grain, and with demand always being met.  It assumes that insurance, freight, port
charges, and handling total a constant $60/metric ton, and that the gross marketing margin
from consignee to retail is 65% (see Chapter Four, section III.C.3. for a discussion of
"competitive" marketing margins).  As the figure shows, retail prices would have been on
average higher by 25% (587 MT/kg vs. 468 MT/kg), but much more stable than actual market
prices, following a steady upward trend.  Too, the recent depression of yellow grain prices in
Maputo due to the oversupply of commercial and emergency grain on markets exaggerates the
difference between normal domestic prices and IPPs.  Through late 1992, the difference
between the two series averaged only 11% (522 MT/kg vs 471 Mt/kg).  
There are three essential requirements if donors and the GOM are always to meet demand at
the prices charged.  First, they must develop jointly a system to elicit demand from consignees
at known prices.  This system must be flexible enough to accommodate both donor needs for
advance planning of quantities and consignee limitations on the length of their feasible
planning horizon.  Donors prefer long horizons, consignees short ones; a balance must be
struck.  Second, the system must have some amount of grain in storage to cover the inevitable
errors between expected and actual demand for the grain.  Finally, donors must take the
initiative to supply consignees with the most reliable information possible regarding arrivals of
commercial and emergency grain from all sources.  The following is a discussion of some of
the key issues which must be considered in designing such a system.  35  An important issue to consider is the geographic market that each consignee tends to
operate in.  For example, consignees with mills north of Maputo (e.g., Capela and de Sousa)
may tend not to sell in Maputo, but rather in the area around their mill.  One would want
sufficient consignees selling in Maputo to ensure effective competition there.  Given what we
know about southern markets, this would likely then be sufficient to enforce competition in
areas north of the city in Gaza and Inhambane provinces (see Chapter Four, section IV.2 for
discussion of this issue).
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1. Eliciting Demand
Key questions include a) how many traders to survey in estimating total demand, b) how to
structure the inquiry to increase the accuracy of response, c) how far ahead of time to inquire,
and d) what incentives to build into the system to encourage accurate response followed by
acceptance of the amount requested.  Past experience with private sector distribution,
especially USAID's dealings with a large number of consignees, should help in answering these
questions.
The system should include enough traders to ensure effective competition between them in
selling the maize.  At the same time, the number should not be unduly large, since the
collection of counterpart funds may become much more difficult as the number of consignees
increases.  This is an important issue, since it relates directly to the amount of funds that are
generated for development activities.  Depending on conditions in Maputo, we suggest that an
effective balance might be struck with anywhere from 10 to 20 consignees.
35  
The survey should be structured to maximize the information available to potential consignees
and thereby increase the accuracy of their response.   One approach would be to conduct the
survey in two rounds.  In a first round, 10 to 20 traders are sent a sheet with the following
information:
- the purchase price, 
- the date of arrival (probably four months hence: see below), 
- the names of every other potential consignee being included in the survey, 
- current stocks and physical location of emergency grain, 
- planned distribution of emergency grain in storage (location and means of distribution), 
- location and size of cash for work programs, and 
- planned emergency arrivals over the next six months, and destination of the grain (to
storage or distribution)
Consignees are assured that their response will be confidential, and are then asked to estimate
how much grain they would want on the specified delivery date.  They could be given two
weeks to respond, during which time they will presumably collect any information they need
to give an accurate response.  When the responses are returned, a second sheet is sent to the
same group of traders, informing them of the total amount requested by all consignees (not
the individual amounts), updating where necessary any of the other information sent in the first
round, and asking them if they would like to modify their request.  They could once again be
given two weeks to respond.  Such an approach might ease the information difficulty and57
result in better estimates than would a single round approach.  Some experimentation might be
necessary.  Yet given the long period of time during which Mozambique will be dependent on
food aid, it seems appropriate that some time and effort be dedicated to developing an
effective way to do this.  Nevertheless, errors will certainly be made no matter the system,
which points out the need for a regulatory stock (see below).
There is no single answer to the question of how far ahead to inquire among potential
consignees regarding desired quantities.  A balance is needed between the need of donors
needs to plan ahead and limited consignee ability to do so.  Following the two-step procedure
outlined above, a reasonable solution might be to conduct the first round four months prior to
expected arrival, finishing the second round one month later, or three months prior to arrival. 
We emphasize that one of the prime determinants of consignees' ability to give reasonably
accurate responses regarding demand three months hence is reliable information about
projected grain arrivals from all sources.  This important issue will be discussed further
below.  
A final issue in eliciting demand is what incentives to create to encourage accurate response by
consignees followed by acceptance of the amount requested.  It may be necessary to create
incentives regarding payment mechanisms so that participation as a consignee is attractive to
traders, and then to predicate continued inclusion on acceptance of the amounts requested. 
Interest rates, loan period, and amount of payment required up-front are mechanisms that can
be used to attract and then keep traders in the program.
2. Regulatory Stocks  
Maintaining a stock of maize to help stabilize prices around the IPP is an important part of the
commercial distribution system.  One might ask why this is necessary, since in a fully market
setting, no public agency would carry such a stock, and traders would have to deal as best
they could with world and domestic market price instability.  Probably the best answer is that
consignees purchasing food aid are not operating in a fully market setting.  Specifically,
consignees are not able to go to the market at any time to obtain more grain if they expect
current supplies to be short.  The food aid program is not that flexible.  This fact argues for a
way in which to cover demand when it exceeds supply.  
Much research over the past two decades has demonstrated the potentially insupportable cost
of grain reserves used for price stabilization (Johnson 1975; Bigman 1985; Pinckney 1988,
1989; Ahmed and Bernard 1989).  While this concern should not be ignored in Mozambique,
it needs also to be placed in context.  Simply put, there is no reason for storage in support of
the food aid program to be unduly costly.  First, one of the largest costs in most storage
schemes is interest on the capital invested in the grain.  With donor and GOM collaboration,
this need not be an important cost for the food aid program.  Donors do not have capital
directly tied-up in the grain, since it has been donated.  GOM, however, must deposit agreed-
upon counterpart funds in bank accounts monitored by the donors.  These funds are not
generated until the product is sold, so that grain in storage means fewer funds in the accounts
at any given point in time.  If donors are flexible to allow payment into the accounts only upon
sale, then GOM need not incur any direct budgetary costs to meet this requirement.  The only
cost, then, would be the opportunity cost of having development funds tied-up in grain rather58
than available to finance projects and other development activities.  This indirect cost should
be easily supported, since the size of the required stock is small relative to the yearly flow of
commercial grain through the system.  As a proportion of total funds generated, then, the
capital tied-up in the stock will also be small.
The reason that the stock can be relatively small is that it will not be made to bear the entire
brunt of price stabilization.  Continual arrivals of food aid shipments mean that the reserve
stock need only absorb residual instability created by the difference between actual consignee
demand and arrival volumes.  Probably the key result of most analyses of price stabilization
schemes has been that effective use of trade, instead of exclusive reliance on stocks, can
dramatically reduce costs.  This is precisely what would be done in Mozambique, with "trade"
in this case being concessionary imports (food aid).
If the GOM and donors do an effective job of eliciting demand for commercial food aid, the
size of the reserve stock in Maputo could probably be as small as 10,000 MT, or
approximately one month of consumption.  The stock could be smaller in Beira.  These stocks
would have to be rotated to ensure quality, and continually replenished when drawn down. 
Mechanisms for doing this in a systematic manner must be developed.  Too, though costs will
be relatively low, GOM and donors must reach agreement on how to pay them.  Other issues
include where the grain will be stored, and how GOM and donors can ensure their security. 
Collaboration among parties is essential if these details are to be worked out in a satisfactory
manner.
3. Providing Information
Market observation and interviews with consignees and informal sector traders over the life of
the MOA/MSU Food Security Project have repeatedly highlighted the importance of
information in the marketing system, and the problems which have been created by poor and
unequally distributed information.  Unfortunately, food aid has been a major source of
uncertainty.  Actual times of arrival (ATA) often differ significantly from estimated times of
arrival (ETA), most informal traders do not even know ETAs or volumes on ships that have
arrived, and donors are often ill informed regarding each others' activities.  If food aid were a
small portion of total supply in Mozambique, these problems might be considered less pressing
than others.  But the very large volumes of food aid which the country receives, and which it
will continue to receive for some years, make it imperative that donors and GOM collaborate
actively to improve the amount, quality, and distribution of information on commercial and
emergency food aid programs.  Above all, this information must be available in a timely
manner to all private sector traders who desire it, whether rural or urban, including
consignees, other armazenistas, informal wholesalers, and loja owners.  This information
should include:
1. Planned emergency and commercial arrivals for one year, including regional
allocations.  This information will be meant to allow traders to form "ballpark"
expectations.  It should be made clear to all that these figures are subject to possibly
substantial change.36  A yellow maize price elasticity of 0.30 means that, if prices increase by 1%, the quantity
(continued...)
59
2. Scheduled arrivals of emergency and commercial grain over the next three to six
months.  This should include donor, product, origin, ship name, quantity, ETA, port,
and expected sales price to consignees.
3. Monthly updates.  Any changes from the schedule in number two should be published
on a monthly basis.
4. Status of ships in port: quantity originally on board, quantity unloaded to date
(preferably by consignee), estimated date of completion, and any relevant information
on quality and other aspects of the shipment.
5. Planned emergency distribution over the next three to six months, by geographical
area.  This information should include volumes by type of distribution (food for work,
free distribution), and volumes to be monetized.
Newspaper and radio should both be used to distribute this information.  Newspaper alone will
exclude many traders, especially those in rural areas which will nevertheless be strongly
affected by the food aid program.  Radio alone is a "soft" medium in that it is difficult to
document the information which is broadcast.  Both together should reach nearly all interested
traders.
D. How Fast to Move
Regardless of the specific pricing approach applied, a key decision is how quickly to move to
import parity.  GOM and donors must carefully consider both the equity and the feasibility of a
rapid move to world price levels. 
1. Equity
Figure 12 and the discussion of competitive margins in section III.C of Chapter Four
dramatically illustrate the equity implications for consumers of such a move.  The discussion in
Chapter Four showed that retail prices in September 1993 would likely be close to 1,100
MT/kg if consignees were charged an IPP and their demand for the grain were satisfied.  This
represents more than a doubling of current market prices.  Figure 12 shows that this large
difference between domestic and IPPs has existed and grown larger for some time.  
Moving suddenly to an import parity regime would impose serious hardship on the lowest
income consumers in the country, especially in large urban centers.  Sahn and Desai estimate
that the poorest 20% of consumers in Maputo allocate 15% of their total food and non-food
expenditures to yellow maize grain and meals.  Price elasticities of demand are likely very low,
as is typical of basic staples in poor countries.  If we assume a price elasticity of 0.30, then a
doubling of prices will decrease the real incomes (purchasing power) of the poorest 20% of
households by 6%
36 
37.  This is a serious reduction in light of their already very low real36(...continued)
actually purchased decreases by only 0.3%.  This is a typical price elasticity for a basic staple
in a poor country.
37  This calculation ignores income effects of the price change.  It also applies the elasticity,
which is properly meant for only very small ("marginal") changes in prices, to a doubling of
prices.  In the absence of a fully specified model of household behavior, however, the
calculation gives a good idea of the magnitude of effect that this price change would imply for
poor consumers.
38  This statement assumes that consignees have paid the full countervalue of the product they
accepted.  To the extent that they have not, losses will be less.
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incomes.  These households are also the least likely to have savings to tide them over until
incomes adjust, nor are they likely to be able to use credit to smooth their consumption.  In
short, the cost of an immediate adjustment to world prices would seem to be unreasonably
large for these consumers.  The current problem of unsustainably low prices took some
months to develop.  A well designed transition of a few months towards more realistic price
levels would thus seem appropriate.
Such a transition could be designed while taking into consideration issues of producer equity
in addition to consumer equity.  The desire to avoid production disincentives is at the heart of
the move to import parity pricing.  One option which might effectively balance producer and
consumer interests is to announce at the beginning of October 1993, that the move to import
parity will be phased in, such that consignee prices will be at this level by the beginning of the
next maize harvest in March 1994.  This would provide clear signals to traders as to the
relative competitiveness of domestic production versus commercial food aid.  It should
provide incentives for some of them to invest more heavily in mobilization of the domestic
harvest.  Announcing the policy some months prior to the harvest should also improve the
effectiveness of price transmission to the producer level, as traders organize to purchase larger
volumes of domestic production.  
2. Feasibility
The very serious oversupply of yellow maize which has developed since late 1992 significantly
complicates the feasibility of moving to import parity pricing.  In addition, prices and price
policy out of Swaziland, and to a lesser extent South Africa, must be considered, though they
do not currently represent a constraint to import parity pricing in Mozambique.  
Many consignees have been badly hurt by events since late 1992.  Retail yellow maize prices in
Maputo since mid-1993 have been only about 30% above consignee prices which had been in
effect since October 1992.  This compares with a best estimate of 65% for a maximum
competitive gross margin between consignee and retail, without storage (Chapter Four). 
Considering storage and interest costs, and product deterioration, it is clear that many
consignees have lost a great deal of money on grain delivered since late 1992
38.  Retail prices
in many areas outside of Maputo have been lower than in the city, reflecting large movements
of emergency grain onto commercial markets, through a combination of diversions and39  The rigidity of this ceiling would depend on the elasticity of supply of white maize meal out
of Swaziland to Maputo.  A very elastic supply would result in a relatively firm ceiling on
yellow maize prices.  An inelastic supply would allow greater room for yellow maize price
increases.  See Chapter Four, section III.B.4. for discussion of the probable elasticity of supply
of white maize to Maputo.
40  There is also reason to believe that white maize meal prices out of Swaziland and South
Africa may seldom if ever be low enough to seriously undercut yellow maize priced at import
parity.  This possibility needs further investigation.  See Annex D for a more detailed
discussion of maize price policy in these two countries, and effects on trade with
Mozambique.
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household sales.  Section V of Chapter Three discusses the current situation of maize markets
in more detail.
Consignees have expressed grave concern about the current situation.  One can imagine that
this concern would be heightened by a proposal to approximately double the price they pay for
yellow maize.  Furthermore, it is not yet clear that the leakage of emergency grain onto the
market is under control.  Table 1 at the beginning of this report shows that projected
emergency arrivals for the last half of 1993 are only 57% of arrivals during the first half of the
year.  Yet total emergency arrivals during 1993 are 39% above those of 1992 and nearly 90%
above those for any other year on record.  It is not clear whether the system has yet been able
to digest this extraordinarily large volume of grain.  Detailed information on current
commercial and emergency stocks, and on projected emergency distribution is critical to more
adequately assess the current situation.
Under normal circumstances, white maize meal prices out of South Africa and Swaziland
could place a ceiling on the price that can be charged consignees for yellow maize grain.
39 
This ceiling would emerge as consumers switch rapidly to white over yellow maize meal as the
price of the latter increases.  Recall that previous analysis has shown a market determined
price premium of around 30% for white maize grain over yellow, when each product was in
normal supply.  If an increasing consignee price begins to reduce this premium, consumers will
choose white over yellow, and this reduction in demand for yellow will be transmitted to
consignees.  These will begin reducing the amount of yellow grain consignees will accept;
demand for yellow could largely dry-up if the two prices are similar and if traders can obtain
sufficient volumes of white meal out of Swaziland.
In the current environment, however, Swazi white meal prices provide ample room for
increasing the price of yellow grain in Mozambique.
40  Based on sales prices in Swaziland and
transport, the cost to Maputo wholesalers of getting Swazi white maize meal to Maputo is











Prod Price: South Africa 417 126 568
Prod Price: Mozambique 351 106 478
Prod Price: Swaziland 540 164 737
Prod Price: Zimbabwe 465 141 635
Maize Board Price to millers for white
grain: SA
545 165 744
World Price: US Gulf Ports FOB* 347 105 473
World Price CIF Durban* 495 150 675
World Price CIF Maputo* 512 155 698
White Maize Flours
Swazi White Maize Sifted Flour in
Swazi (50-kg bags: Rand 53 each)
1060 342 1,348
Swazi White Maize Sifted Flour in
Swazi (50-kg bags: Rand 49 each)
980 316 1,244
Swazi White Maize Sifted Flour in
Maputo (50-kg bags, Rand 49 each
plus 4,000 meticais/sack freight)
1051 339 1,334
SA White Maize Sifted Flour in SA
(50-kg bags, Rand 40 in
Pretoria/Johannesburg)
800 242 1,091
SA White Maize Sifted Flour in
Maputo, informal trade (as above,
plus 100 Rand/ton freight)
900 273 1,227
SA White Maize Sifted Flour in
Maputo, formal trade (as above, plus
17% import duty)
1036  313 1,413
Moz whole white meal, Bazuca 960
* World prices are approximate.  Flour prices are wholesale level.
Sources: Maize Board of South Africa, price announcement memo of June 28,
1993; interviews with South African and Swaziland traders, as well as observed
market prices; SADCC Food Security Monthly Update, 31 May 1993, Harare,
Zimbabwe; Comissão Nacional de Salários e Preços, 30 March 1993.
Table 4. Regional White Maize Grain and Flour Prices41  The premium is equal to the product of the two premiums minus 1.0: (1.365)(1.3) - 1 =
0.77.
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.  Based on typical margins, this would result in a retail price of 1,700-1,800 MT/kg, more
than three times the price of whole yellow meal in Maputo.  Historical evidence indicates that
the vast majority of consumers in Maputo are not willing to pay such a large premium for this
higher quality white meal.  In fact, there has been no Swazi white maize meal in Maputo
markets during all of 1993, despite normal production in that country and no known barriers
to the previously flourishing informal trade.  This fact is most plausibly explained by the very
large difference in relative prices.
Available data allow an indirect estimation of the price premium consumers in Maputo may be
willing to pay for refined white meal from Swaziland over whole yellow meal.  Recall from
Chapter Four that the historical premium for white grain over yellow grain (taken as an
indication of the "pure preference for color") is 35% to 38%.  Also from Chapter Four, the
historical preference for refined yellow meal over whole yellow meal is about 30%.  This is
taken as an indication of the "pure preference for processing".  These two figures give an
estimated premium of refined white meal over whole yellow meal of 77%.
41  We estimated
earlier that import parity pricing of yellow maize grain would result in a retail maize grain
price of approximately 1,080 MT/kg.  Based on a milling charge of 30-50 MT/kg, whole
yellow meal prices at retail would not exceed 1,100 MT/kg, giving a 60% price difference
between refined white and whole yellow meals (1750/1100).  So Maputo consumers might on
average be willing to pay as much as 77% more for refined white meal than for whole yellow
meal, while import parity pricing of yellow maize would result in a price difference of about
60%.  
These figures are all very approximate, but seem reasonable in light of available evidence. 
They suggest that a movement to import parity pricing would result in a greater inflow to
Mozambique of white maize meal from Swaziland, thus reducing demand for yellow grain. 
They do not suggest a drastic reduction in demand for food aid.  The most balanced
conclusion thus seems to be that, at this time, prices in Swaziland do not present a significant
barrier to import parity pricing of yellow grain in Mozambique.  The current yellow maize
over-supply and continuing uncertainty about 64
emergency distribution does present such a barrier.  In short, this analysis indicates that donors
should feel free to move toward import parity on yellow maize, but that they should do so
with caution, and above all in consultation with consignees.  
IV. Distribution
Once quantities of food aid are determined and prices are applied, the way in which food aid is
distributed may have important effects on the functioning of markets.  Distribution issues are
especially important on the emergency side.  
A. Commercial Food Aid
The two key issues in Mozambique regarding commercial food aid distribution are the
appropriate number of consignees for any given shipment, and what size of regulatory stock to
hold, if any.  This issue of consignee numbers was analyzed in Chapter Four, section III,
where it was concluded that "on average, supply to the market will be lower, and retail prices
higher, when there is a monopoly over food aid than when sufficient consignees have access to
make the system competitive".  All else equal, one would thus prefer to have sufficient
consignees to ensure competition.  The issue was further discussed in Chapter Five, section
III.C.  Here, it was noted that the challenge is to balance the desire for effective competition
with ease of administration and ensuring repayment of counterpart funds.  We concluded that
"an effective balance might be struck with anywhere from 10 to 20 consignees", depending on
the geographic market that each tends to operate in.   
Section II of this chapter discussed the issue of regulatory stocks, why they might be
necessary in the food aid program being proposed, and how large they might need to be.  This
section will attempt briefly to address three other key details of a stocking scheme: who
should have access, under what conditions they should have access, and what price they
should be charged. 
The primary reason for maintaining a reserve stock is to help stabilize prices around import
parity.  In addition to this concern with price stability, it is conceivable that concerns about
market power at the level of consignee might arise under certain circumstances.  Though
collusion seems unlikely among as many as 20 consignees, markets in Mozambique are still
relatively undeveloped and the capital and know-how necessary for effective trading is not
widely distributed.  The design of the reserve stock might be used to address this concern by
allowing informal wholesale traders, in addition to consignees and other armazenistas, to have
access to the stock.  By allowing access to anyone willing to purchase, for cash payment, at
least one or two metric tons at a time, informal wholesalers would have some recourse in the
event that consignees were able to collude and drive-up the price they charge.  At the same
time, it would be necessary to design the stock release policy so that non-consignee traders
desire access to it only if consignees are, in fact, driving up the price.  To prevent large
armazenistas (consignees or not) from capturing the entire stock, it may be necessary to limit
total purchases by any individual during a given month to 100 or 200 metric tons.
The price charged to individuals drawing on the reserve stock should be above the consignee
price, for three reasons.  First, there will be costs of maintaining the stock, and these should be65
recovered in the sales price.  Second, if the consignee price were applied to product from this
reserve, consignees could rightfully complain that they would have difficulty moving their own
stock, since potential clients could buy from the reserve rather than from consignees.  Finally,
the reserve is meant to prevent undue price increases beyond import parity.  It will not be
capable of preventing relatively small deviations, and should not be used for this purpose.  By
charging a higher price for product from the reserve, this product will come into play only
when prices show a significant jump, and the use of the reserve will thereby be more or less
automatically limited to its feasible objective.
The price for reserve grain might be fixed 15% to 20% above the consignee price, though the
final figure could be negotiated with consignees.  Such a difference should allow consignees to
earn normal profits on their own product without providing an incentive to their clients to
bypass them and purchase from the reserve.  At the same time, it would bring the reserve into
play before price increases become extreme.  Finally, we expect that, under normal
circumstances and assuming approximately 15 consignees for any given shipment (we suggest
10-20), competition among those consignees will keep profits at normal levels.  If these are
below the 15-20% price premium on reserve stock, consumers will be benefited.
By charging such a premium on product from the reserve, it should be feasible to avoid any
administrative rule on when the reserve should be open and when closed for purchases.  In
other words, the reserve could be always open, but with the likelihood that traders would
choose to buy only when market prices have risen beyond levels allowing armazenistas to earn
normal profits.  Thus, the stock should be largely self-regulating, and the burden of
administering it should thereby be reduced.
B. Emergency Food Aid
There are two basic ways in which emergency food aid may affect food markets.  The source
and type of food aid to be distributed, along with related policies, must be determined by the
donors, recipient countries and the NGOs involved.  Once the aid is obtained, the design of
the delivery system to households in need must be decided.
1. Source of food aid
The proper source of food aid depends upon donor objectives, recipient country needs, and
supplies in various markets.  Yellow maize food aid from the U.S. to Mozambique is from
surplus U.S. production, whereas the WFP and others have purchased white maize in
Zimbabwe for delivery in Mozambique.  The Zimbabwean purchases are an example of
"triangular trade" in which a donor makes cash purchases of food in one developing country
with surpluses and ships the food to a recipient country.  Another alternative, which NGO's
are beginning to use in Mozambique, is the use of local purchases of white maize from surplus
regions (Nampula, for example) for distribution in the same area during the hungry season or
for shipment to the south where local production is insufficient for needs.  
The motivation behind local purchases is three-fold.  First, locally-purchased goods may be
preferred by consumers.  In Mozambique, white maize is preferred over yellow maize.  Also,
local purchases may reduce transport and storage costs.  More importantly, local purchases66
are thought to provide development incentives to local commerce, while avoiding the
producer disincentives of additional imported supplies.  
Research on the cost-effectiveness of local purchases and triangular transactions indicates that
these can be cost-effective, but they are not necessarily so.  The lack of regular surplus
production of white maize in the region means that transactions occur irregularly.  The
developmental effects are thus mitigated since donors are likely not able to make long term
commitments to buy.  In Southern Africa, the recent drought provides experience on the
covariance of production risks across countries in the region and the consequent inability to
depend upon regional supplies during crises.  
In Mozambique, initial efforts at local purchase during June and July 1993 were not
successful.  The prices at which traders offered white maize were well above IPPs (ranging
from $250 - $300 per metric ton, compared to approximately $155 per metric ton IPP for
yellow maize grain).  Traders were unable to fulfill the terms of the contract, both in volumes
and in price.  During the 1993 harvest, World Vision negotiated local purchases in Nampula
Province for 4,000 metric tons, using a newspaper announcement for bids.  Problems arose in
getting the quantities offered at the prices negotiated and two traders dropped out of the
process when they could not fulfill conditions agreed upon.  The high offer prices limited WFP
efforts at local purchase, as well.  More recently, price bids by traders have been lower, and
NGO's have had more success in local purchases.  
NGO presence in the maize market had effects during 1993 which illustrate both the potential
and the problems associated with local purchases in a setting such as Mozambique.  Traders'
expectations that NGO's would purchase large quantities clearly stimulated them to purchase
and store white grain that they may not have otherwise obtained.  During August 1993,
traders continually referred to SOMOL as a principal outlet for their supplies.  One of
SOMOL's principal activities was grain sales to NGO's.  At the same time, differing
expectations between traders and NGO's have lead to some friction.  As stated earlier, very
high initial bid prices by traders caused NGO's to refuse to buy.  Later reductions in prices
lead to sales, but traders interviewed in Nampula City complained that the prices were too
low, and that they had a serious problem of white maize stocks which they could not move. 
Many of these problems might be expected in the early stages of local purchase activity in a
setting such as Mozambique, where information is poor, marketing infrastructure is
underdeveloped, and the system is in a state of flux from policy changes and the ending of the
war.  Nevertheless, it is clear that local purchases are not an easy solution to concerns about
disincentive effects of yellow maize food aid.  Such purchases can benefit farmers, traders,
NGO's, and food aid recipients if they elicit a marketed supply response that would not have
been forthcoming in the absence of the NGO activity, and if expectations of traders and
NGO's are similar.  In 1993 in Nampula province, the supply response seems to have been
forthcoming, but conflicting expectations and unstable market conditions caused some
difficulties between the parties.
2. Delivery Systems
With peace, food aid policy is shifting its emphasis from emergency objectives to development
objectives.  Food for work and cash for work are frequently cited as means to utilize42 For further information regarding the issues, practices, and experiences with food and cash
for work programs, see Clay (1986) and von Braun, Teklu, and Webb (1991).  The latter also
summarizes experience in Africa with labor-based programs.
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assistance for development purposes.  In both food for work and cash for work, physical
infrastructure construction projects are most frequently designed to employ labor.  Programs
may be targeted administratively based on income or asset criteria or they may be self-
targeting through low wage rates or provision of inferior goods.
42  With these labor programs,
there must be seasonal excess labor supply and the target population must be capable of the
work (Clay 1986). 
In Mozambique, food and cash for work schemes need to be designed carefully.  Many
refugees are returning to fields on which a substantial amount of work is needed in preparation
for cropping.  Drawing scarce labor into public works projects to the detriment of agricultural
production would be a mistake in the long run.  There may be seasonal surpluses in labor
supplies such that public works projects can be scheduled to avoid conflicts with agricultural
production.  This issue needs to be investigated, and works projects designed with this in
mind.
Another issue of particular importance in Mozambique is the response of food markets to
increased demand.  Cash for work projects increase the demand for food by increasing cash
income.  If supplies of food and consumer goods are not elastic, local inflation could be the
result (von Braun, Teklu, and Webb, 1991).  In areas in which the markets are fragmented due
to lack of roads and other infrastructural problems, markets do not function efficiently and
food for work programs might be most appropriate.  In areas where the markets do function
and trade is relatively competitive, food for work undermines the commercial trading sector
whereas cash for work promotes the development of the private sector marketing system, a
key goal in Mozambique.  This requires that donors assess needs carefully to understand
whether hunger is caused by households' lack of entitlement or by the market's inability to
provide food.
A major difficulty in Mozambique is the lack of human resources for the administration of
labor-based public works programs, whether they be food or cash for work.  Food for work
takes more administrative capacity than cash for work, but both are management intensive. 
(This is noted by von Braun, Teklu, and Webb (1991), as well as in conversations with WFP
personnel in Maputo).  The administrative requirements of these projects can be seen as one of
their indirect benefits, since they may help develop local administrative capacity and
construction skills for maintenance of public works.  Long run development goals can be met
through this training.  Given the limited investment capacity of GOM, labor-based programs
that increase local maintenance capacity, for example, are critical for long-run infrastructure
needs.  For the donor community, the increased administrative costs present a problem. 
Programs may be assessed by the ratio of received benefits over total costs and high
administrative costs mean a relatively low ratio which will need justification.   68
An additional problem is caused by the planning needs and long time periods between planning
and execution of public works projects.  While labor-based assistance programs can contribute
to development in the medium and long run, they cannot be used to relieve an immediate
excess supply problem or impending famine.  Emergency programs for distribution must be
separately developed.  With its combination of highly vulnerable populations (returning
refugees and internally displaced persons) and severely damaged infrastructure, development
plans in Mozambique must include a range of short, medium, and long run strategies in which
food aid plays a central role. 
Thus, there is no simple answer to how best to distribute emergency food aid.  A range of
approaches must be used in any situation.  We suggest, however, that cash for work schemes
should receive significantly greater emphasis than they currently do, especially in the south and
central portions of the country.  Evidence indicates that many areas of the southern and central
regions are effectively integrated into a marketing system, with trade flows from surplus to
deficit areas, and that this integration is likely to continue to improve.  In the north, there is
evidence of emerging, though still weak, integration.  The market can therefore be increasingly
relied upon as an effective distributor of food aid to those in need.  The challenge will be to
put cash in the hands of those who have insufficient effective demand.  Evidence also indicates
that food for work and free distribution have had serious negative effects on markets in the
central region, depressing prices at the same time that they reduced market demand (since
potential buyers received food either free or against work).  None of this is to say that well
targeted free distribution and food for work no longer have a role to play in Mozambique.  It
is to say that targeting needs to improve, that quantities distributed in these ways need to be
reduced, and that a significantly greater proportion of the emergency effort needs to be
dedicated to cash for work.
Cash for work programs raise two important issues beyond those already discussed: how they
are to be financed, and their effects on the commercial food aid program.  Donors may be
unwilling to finance cash for work programs directly.  Instead, the financing may require the
monetization (selling into the market) of grain that was initially meant for emergency
distribution.  The most likely candidates for carrying out this monetization are NGO's.  It is
critical that the price these organizations charge be comparable to that charged for grain sold
directly in the commercial food aid program.  If the price on monetized emergency grain is
significantly below that of commercial grain, the potentially large volumes which could be
monetized would negate the positive effects of an import parity pricing scheme on incentives
for domestic production of white maize.  
Monetizing emergency food aid will likely require that less commercial food aid be sold into
the market, for three reasons.  First, not all revenue from the monetization will be delivered to
recipients, since cash for work programs involve administrative and material costs.  Second,
recipients will not spend all the cash that they receive on yellow maize products.  In economic
terms, the income elasticity of demand for yellow maize grain, while relatively high for the
lowest income consumers, is unquestionably less than one and likely not higher than 0.20. 
Finally, yellow maize that recipients do buy is likely to carry a price above what it was
monetized at, since it will have passed through some levels of the marketing system.  69
These three factors will reduce the absorption of yellow maize through cash for work
programs.  To the extent that these programs benefit only those who previously had severely
restricted effective demand, the absorption of yellow maize will be increased.  Nevertheless,
monetized emergency food aid will inevitably substitute for commercial food aid.  A simple
example will illustrate.  Let's assume that 20% of the revenue from monetized emergency
grain for cash for work is used for administrative and material costs.  This leaves 80% for
delivery to recipients.  Let's furthermore assume a relatively high income elasticity of demand
for yellow maize among recipients of 0.30.  This means that 24% (0.8*0.3) of total revenue
from monetization will be spent on yellow maize.  Finally, let's assume that the marketing
margin on the grain which was monetized is 30%.  This means that, of the volume of grain
which was monetized, only 18.5% (0.24/1.3) will be purchased by project beneficiaries.  The
other 81.5% will be a net addition to the amount of grain that would have been available in the
market without the cash for work project.  To avoid reducing market prices, commercial food
aid quantities will have to be reduced accordingly.  
Note that the assumptions in this example result in a high-end estimate of absorption; higher
project costs, lower income elasticities of demand, and higher marketing costs would all
reduce up-take by project participants, such that it may be as low as 10%.  This presents a
serious policy challenge to the design of emergency food aid programs which include the
monetization of emergency grain to finance cash for work: how can one design monetization
to capture the benefits of cash for work while reducing the probability of excessive food aid
supplies to the market in the commercial program?  Two options exist:
1. Allow NGO's to monetize their own grain, but maintain close coordination with the
commercial food aid program.  Keep prices of monetized emergency grain and
commercial grain comparable, and allow NGO's to monetize only those amounts of
grain, and in those areas, that have been previously communicated to the commercial
program.
2. Channel all monetized food aid through the commercial program, earmarking an
agreed upon proportion of revenues for NGO's to finance cash for work programs.
The advantages of the second approach may be substantial.  First, it would eliminate any
possibility of price differences on yellow maize from different sources, since all would move
through the single commercial food aid channel.  Second, this approach would allow direct
control of the amount of food aid grain directly entering markets, eliminating one source of
uncertainty for consignees responsible for receiving the grain.  This improved information is an
important benefit when attempting to program commercial food aid quantities based on
market demand for the food aid grain, as has been proposed in this document.70
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will summarize briefly the key conclusions that have emerged from the analysis in
this paper, and present a series of recommendations that may form the broad outlines of a plan
of action for the continued reform of the food aid program in Mozambique.  As stated at the
outset of this paper, the emphasis will be on commercial food aid; emergency aid will be dealt
with as it affects food markets.
I. Summary of Conclusions
Food aid shipments of yellow maize to Mozambique have been among the largest in the world
for many years, and these volumes increased sharply in 1992 and 1993, totalling over a half a
million tons each year.  Since its inception, the food aid program has saved many thousands if
not millions of lives.  Significant volumes of aid will continue to be necessary for some years
to come, yet the fundamental conditions in the country have changed, and the food aid
program must change with them.  Peace has arrived, and private markets are continuing to
develop, though they are still weak, especially in northern areas of the country.  Properly
managed, food aid can contribute to the transition to a robust private production and
marketing economy.  Improperly managed, food aid may derail or significantly slow the
process.  
Prior to late 1992, commercial food aid quantities typically did not meet demand at the very
low prices that were charged to consignees.  As a result, consignees earned sometimes very
sizeable rents (or excess profits).  During this time, fluctuating food aid volumes and uncertain
timing of arrivals lead to extreme retail price instability.  Prices charged to consignees had
little if any effect on retail prices.  Since late 1992, leakage of unprecedented quantities of
emergency grain onto markets has combined with very large commercial shipments to
drastically reduce prices throughout the marketing system.  The consignee price would likely
have placed a floor on retail prices during this time if it were not for the large leakage of
emergency supplies.  Due to this leakage, many consignees certainly lost large amounts of
money during 1993.
Evidence indicates that continued arrivals of large amounts of yellow maize sold at low prices
will create disincentives for the production and marketing of domestic white maize.  At the
same time, the presence of yellow maize in the market has provided consumers with increased
options, especially among the poorest.  The problem is not the mere presence of yellow maize,
but rather the volumes which enter and the prices which are charged.  Very large volumes
depress market prices and harm farmers.  Lesser volumes with low consignee prices generate
excess profits for consignees with little or no pass-through of the low prices to consumers. 
We suggest that an orderly reduction in the amount of food aid and a consignee price
approximately equal to import parity levels are consistent with the long-run goal of
reactivating the rural economy and integrating it into the national market system.  71
It remains unclear whether the leakage of emergency grain onto markets is under control. 
Thus, a rapid increase in consignee price at this time (October 1993) would likely cause a
drastic reduction in consignee demand: they would have little if any market for the more
expensive product.  The retail price during September 1993 is approximately half of IPP, and
is similar in nominal terms to prices which prevailed from the middle of 1990 through the
middle of 1991.  Again, immediate movement to IPP does not seem warranted, due to the
doubling of consignee prices that it would induce, but a systematic move in that direction may
be appropriate.  A phased move to IPP over the course of some months will not result in real
prices any higher than those typically found in the past.  In addition, IPPs will be lower than
peak prices that have occurred during times of scarcity.
Prices of white maize in Swaziland present no barrier to import parity pricing of maize in
Mozambique.  Due to the nature of supply from this source, we believe that they seldom if
ever will present such a barrier.
Stabilizing dollar prices results in very little metical price stabilization, due to the unstable
metical/dollar exchange rate.  Whether consignees would value dollar price stabilization in its
own right needs to be investigated.  Yet even an unstabilized IPP in meticais would have been
more stable than market prices in Maputo since 1990.  
Market integration is improving in many areas of the south and center of the country.  It is still
weak but also improving in the north.  This means that in many areas of the south and center,
markets can be relied on to distribute food aid quite widely, depending on effective demand. 
Markets will be increasingly capable of this in the north.  Nonetheless, markets cannot be the
only means of food aid distribution.  Various mechanisms for emergency distribution will
continue to be important in many areas.
Price transmission from the retail to the producer level is still relatively weak, especially in the
north, but this too is improving.  In the north, the weak marketing system may be a greater
constraint to increased domestic production than is food aid at this time.  Yet food aid has
had negative effects in this area, as traders indicate that low yellow maize prices in Maputo
have reduced the flow of white grain from the north to the south.  As the marketing system
develops, food aid will become a more important constraint unless it is properly managed.  In
the south and especially the central regions, food aid currently is a constraint, due to
oversupply.  If consignee prices remain low on future commercial food aid shipments of
yellow maize, and especially if demand is met at these prices, white maize producers in the
south and center will be faced with serious disincentives.  
Information about commercial and emergency quantities and the timing of their arrival is
critical to improving the food aid program and allowing it to facilitate rather than impede
market development.  This information must be widely available in a timely manner.  To
generate this information, greater coordination among participants is necessary.  More to the
point, it is necessary to include private sector traders, from throughout the country, in the
process.  They can provide the best available information on supply conditions, and they will
be affected by both commercial and emergency supplies, so they need to be kept informed.43  See OECD (1993) for an example of how this has been done with apparent success in the
Sahel, through the Food Aid Charter to the Countries of the Sahel.
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II. Recommendations
The following recommendations are meant to be concrete proposals for debate.  We suggest
that they would be effective starting points for the discussion, but emphasize that final details
of the design need to be reached through a process of dialogue between donors, GOM, and
prospective consignees.
43
We recommend that donors begin now to move towards import parity pricing of maize.
How fast to move: The GOM and donors should meet at the earliest possible date with past
consignees, inform them that a decision has been made to move towards import parity pricing
of yellow maize, and negotiate with them the best way to accomplish this.  An agreement on
the basic timetable should be quickly agreed on, then widely announced through newspaper
and radio.
We suggest that the move begin with the next ship of commercial maize which arrives, and
that full import parity be reached by March, or by the first ship that arrives after March.  The
logic of this timing is based on the crop calendar: planting is taking place now over the next
month, and the harvest begins in March.  Both traders and producers should know prior to
planting what the new food aid policy is, to remove this important source of uncertainty. 
Reaching import parity by the beginning of the harvest will help reduce the possibility that new
commercial food aid shipments will cause production disincentives for white maize.  See
Chapter Five, section III.D for more detail.
Eliciting demand:  We suggest the approach outlined in Chapter Five section III.C.  This is a
two-round process.  In the first round, in both Maputo and Beira, a group of 10 to 20
consignees are given information on the purchase price, the date of arrival, the names of other
potential consignees being surveyed, current stocks and physical location of emergency grain,
and planned emergency arrivals over the next six months.  They are asked to indicate the
quantity of commercial maize food aid they would like to receive four months hence, and are
given two weeks to respond.  Following receipt of the responses, they are told the total
quantity requested among all consignees, and each is given a chance to revise his or her
request.  They again have two weeks to respond.  Thus, the process starts four months, and
ends three months, prior to expected arrival of the grain.
Key issues which need to be carefully resolved include how to select the 10 to 20 consignees
to be surveyed, how to create incentives for accurate responses, and how to create incentives
for each to take delivery on the amount they indicate in the second round.
Pricing the grain:  We suggest that a step price approach be used, based on a 60 month
moving average of past prices.  The marketing year should likely be March through February. 
We are recommending the step price approach instead of the market price approach (even
though our analysis showed very little stabilization of metical prices in this approach) for a73
number of reasons.  First, if exchange rates do stabilize, then the step price approach will
provide greater metical price stability than the market price approach.  Second, dollar price
stability might itself be valuable to consignees.  Finally, this approach may be administratively
simpler, since dollar prices have to be calculated only once a year, rather than determined for
each new ship.  We recommend the 60 month rather than the 36 month series because the
latter is subjected to rather large price changes from year-to-year.  See Chapter Five, section
III.B.2 for more detail.
A key issue to resolve is what type of explicit incentive, if any, should be offered armazenistas
to participate as consignees.
Maintaining a Reserve stock:  We recommend that a stock of 10,000 to 15,000 metric tons
be maintained in Maputo, with physical management of the stock contracted to a private firm. 
A smaller stock should be kept in Beira.  The price for traders wishing to purchase from this
stock may be 15% to 20% above the consignee price, though the final figure should be
negotiated with consignees.  Anyone willing to buy at least one or two metric tons at a time
should have access to the stock, but purchases by individuals during any given month should
be limited to 100 or 200 tons.  Consider requiring that all payments be made in full at time of
delivery.  See Chapter Five section III.C for more detail.
The stock should be rotated with each arriving ship; to ensure this, as a ship arrives, each
consignee might be required to accept an amount of grain from the reserve stock (instead of
from the new shipment) proportional to his/her share of the current shipment.  This same
amount would be deposited into the reserve from the new shipment to maintain the stock.  For
example, suppose the reserve stock is 15,000 metric tons.  Suppose also that a ship with
40,000 metric tons arrives in port, and consignee X is to receive 10% of that amount (i.e.,
4,000 mt).  Then that consignee would be obligated to receive his 3,000 metric tons in the
following proportion: 1,500 mt from the reserve stock (this being 10% of that stock), and the
balance (2,500 mt) from the new shipment.  1,500 mt from the shipment would be deposited
in the stock to replenish it.  A consignee receiving 15% of the shipment (6,000 mt) would
receive 2,250 mt (15% of 15,000) from stock, and 3,750 mt from the shipment.  For this
trader, 2,250 mt from the shipment would be deposited in the stock to maintain its level.
Emergency distribution:  Leakage of emergency grain on to the market must be halted as
quickly as possible.  Unless this happens, any move to import parity pricing will be extremely
difficult.  At the same time that leakage is reduced, mechanisms must be developed to avoid
excessive emergency deliveries that will harm local markets.  It is important to note that
excessive deliveries in one market area, given the weakness of markets in many areas, can
have negative effects on that market; overall emergency supplies need not be excessive.
Once the emergency program is under control, the GOM and donors should move
aggressively towards cash for work projects as a partial substitute to continued free
distribution and food for work.  These projects should be implemented soon in areas where
markets have demonstrated effective integration.  This would include large areas of the south
and central regions of the country.  The north should be monitored for signs of improved
market integration, and cash for work begun as soon as possible.  We recommend that NGO's74
not be allowed to monetize grain to finance these projects.  Rather, financing could be through
earmarking an agreed-upon proportion of revenues from the commercial food aid program for
the financing of cash for work projects.  
Market prices should be used to help plan emergency distribution.  Commercial food aid is
first sold in urban areas, principally Maputo and Beira.  For this grain to reach rural areas
(where most emergency distribution takes place) involves sometimes substantial transport
costs.  Thus, if yellow maize is present in the markets where emergency distribution is being
conducted, its price should be above prices in the urban areas.  In addition, both prices should
be above consignee prices (recall that we estimated a 65% competitive marketing margin from
consignee to retail in Maputo).  Distortions in these price relationships may be an indicator of
leakage from emergency distribution to the market.  Specifically, if rural prices in emergency
distribution areas are similar to or below urban prices, this may indicate that recipients are
selling some of their rations to the market, or that the emergency distribution has depressed
demand in the area.  In either case, it would be desirable to reduce emergency distribution in
the area to avoid negative effects on local production and marketing of white maize.  
Coordinating the process:  The GOM and donors should take the lead in forming a
commission composed of donors, officials from the Ministries of Commerce, Finance and
Agriculture, NGO's, consignees, and other interested traders.  This commission would be in
charge of planning commercial food aid volumes through use of the system proposed above
for eliciting demand, or some similar system.  It would also be responsible for collecting a
wide range of relevant information and making it widely available to the public in a timely
manner.  This information should include but not be limited to data on market prices and
supplies, emergency distribution plans (free distribution, food for work, cash for work),
prospective commercial and emergency arrivals, and current status of ships in port.  The
commission would need a technical secretariat with one or two well-trained economists
familiar with food markets in Mozambique and technical advisors familiar with logistical
planning, grain storage, and other issues.  Newspaper and radio should both be used to
distribute information.  See Chapter Five section III.C for more detail.
A good example of this type of coordination may be found in the Sahel, where donors and
government have formed the Food Aid Charter to the Countries of the Sahel.  This Charter
provides a broad statement of principles which forms the basis for more specific negotiations
regarding food aid programs.  See Annex F for a copy of the Charter.75
ANNEX A
DRAFT FOOD AID DATA BASE DOCUMENTATION
Data files:  
SANTOS.SYS:  US Commercial food aid yellow maize shipments for 1992 and beginning of
1993, based on daily unloading data from USAID/Maputo office.  
FAPSTOT.SYS:  Based on the MinComm DSA Food Aid Pledges and Shipments Annual
Reports.  Has data for maize, beans, rice, and wheat.  Data for 1992 is incomplete, especially
since 6/92.
WFP.SYS:  World Food Programme database from Rome.  
FA-EEC.SYS:  Data on EEC emergency and commercial arrivals, January 1992 - mid 1993,
based on Socotec records.  White and yellow maize products only.  
USEMERG.SYS:  Combines several data sources (old USAID Emergency Food Aid
spreadsheets, WFP and UNILOG data sheets) to develop data set of US emergency and
project maize shipments.  
WFPPROJ.SYS:  Monthly emergency needs projection from WFP based on estimates of
beneficiaries (number of returnees and internally displaced) and monthly per person
consumption needs of 13.5 kgs of maize.  Not included in the computer file are the needs for
pulses and edible oil, although these estimates can be found in the document.76
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* Indicates that we have hard copy of data but have not entered the data into a computer file as yet.44  The model abstracts from the fact that yellow and white maize and meals are different
products.  While this is clearly counterfactual, it should not be the source of serious objections
to the model - yellow and white maize are highly substitutable in consumption.  This means
that the entry of white maize from Swaziland will strongly influence the price of yellow maize,
just as the arrival of a boat of yellow maize, during periods of normal white maize supply,




A STATIC CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE RETAIL PRICE
EFFECTS OF YELLOW MAIZE FOOD AID
The purpose of this section is to examine conceptually the implications of alternative pricing
and distribution policies for commercial food aid on market prices of the commodity being
donated.  In the case of Mozambique, that commodity is yellow maize grain.  The principal
focus is on the effects of the official consignee price and the number of consignees on
consumer prices.  The models used are necessarily simplified, but gradually introduce key
characteristics of the situation in Mozambique.  In the body of the report, we evaluate the
similarities and key differences between the assumptions of the model and the characteristics
of the marketing system as it works in Mozambique.  These two analyses - abstract, formal,
and simplified in this section, less abstract and more "realistic" in section B - allow important
generalizations to be made regarding the best policy for the pricing and distribution of food
aid.
We begin with the simplest "base case" in which we examine a single time period and assume a
perfectly competitive market structure with no source of supply beyond food aid.  The second
case introduces one key modification: the presence of an outside source of supply.  This is
meant to capture the white maize trade with Swaziland, which is so influential on Maputo
prices during normal levels of supply.
44  Case three is a variant of case two, assuming an
infinitely elastic outside supply as opposed to case two's finitely elastic supply.  Finally, case
four keeps the assumption of an outside source of supply (finitely elastic), but assumes a
monopoly market structure at the consignee level for yellow maize in Mozambique.
The models show two levels of demand.  Retail demand depicts the demand of retailers for
yellow maize, this being derived from exogenous consumer demand.  It is the willingness of
retailers to pay to wholesalers for varying quantities of product.  Wholesale demand is demand
by consignees who have access to food aid.  It depicts the willingness of these consignees to
pay for varying quantities of product, and is derived from the demand curve they face. 
Exogenous consumer demand is not included, as it would only complicate the analysis without
adding any insights.
A distinction is made between 1) the structure of the market for food aid at the level of
consignee, and 2) the market structure beyond this level and for any outside source of supply. 
Donors and GOM in effect determine market structure at the consignee level by how many78
consignees they approve.  At higher levels, the market for food aid is assumed always to be
competitive, as is the market at all levels for outside supplies (Swaziland).  This seems
reasonable, given what we know of the marketing system in Maputo, and the trade with
Swaziland (MOA/MSU Research Team, 1993). 
It should be noted that the results relate only to mean market clearing prices during a time
period lasting from the arrival of one food aid shipment and ending immediately prior to the
arrival of another such shipment.  Price fluctuation within these periods, and other issues not
addressed with the formal models, will be examined through logical analysis outside the formal
models.
One of the key outcomes that the models highlight are the "rents" received by consignees. 
These are defined as the difference between the willingness of consignees to pay and what they
actually pay, times quantity.  In other words, rents might be viewed as the "excess profits" that
consignees earn just by having first access to the grain at fixed prices.
I. Case 1: The Base Case
This is the simplest case.  All others will introduce complications to it.  It is a perfectly
competitive, single period, closed economy model.  Specific relevant characteristics include:
1. Supply is perfectly inelastic, being fixed by donor/GOM decision.  There is no source
of supply other than food aid
2. It is a single period model, implying 
a. no uncertainty about the amounts to be shipped in future periods (there are no
future periods)
b. all supply must be sold during this period
3. The market structure is perfectly competitive, but ...
4. The government/donor determined sale price to consignees is below the willingness of











Figure B1. The Base Case
Results are depicted in Figure A1, where
Dr = retail market demand
Dw = wholesale (those who receive food aid) market demand, derived from retail
demand (assume fixed mark-up for ease of exposition)
Sfa = fixed supply from food aid during this period
Pmr = market determined retail price (willingness to pay to wholesalers)
Pmw = unobserved market determined wholesale price (willingness of wholesalers to
pay for available supply)
Pow = official price to wholesalers
Results and Implications:  Wholesalers pay Pow but their willingness to pay is Pmw, resulting
in a rent of PowabPmw (the shaded area in the graph).  They sell at Pmr.  Key implications are:80
1. As long as the official sales price to consignees is less than the willingness of
consignees to pay for the fixed supply (i.e., Pow < Pmw), the retail price is entirely
determined by the quantity of food aid supplied to the market.  
2. An increase in the official consignee price (Pow) up to the willingness of consignees to
pay (Pmw) will not affect the sales price at retail.  Rather, it will decrease the rent to
wholesalers.  
3. When the official price is exactly equal to the consignees' willingness to pay (Pow =
Pmw), all rents will be eliminated.  Past this point (when Pow > Pmw), consignees will not
accept all the food aid at the official price Pow - they are not willing to pay that high a
price for such a large quantity.  As a result, supply to the market will fall and retail
prices will rise.
So when the official consignee price is greater than the consignee's willingness to pay
(Pow > Pmw), consignee price does influence retail price, through its impact on the
quantity of food aid that the consignees agree to accept and place on the market.
4. A perfect auction would force wholesalers to bid their actual willingness to pay Pmw,
thus eliminating rents without affecting consumer prices.
















Figure B2. Open Economy Model with Less than Infinitely Elastic Outside Supply
Market structure is still competitive, but now there exists an elastic (market based) supply
source in addition to the still perfectly inelastic food aid supply.  Figure A2 depicts this
situation, where
Sm = the market based outside supply, 
St = total supply (horizontal summation of food aid and external supplies), 
Qm = quantity imported from external market, 
Qfa = quantity supplied to the market from food aid, 
Qt = total quantity supplied to the market, and 
all other terms are as previously defined
Results and Implications:  Wholesalers are willing to pay Pmw, obtaining Qfa+Qm = Qt.  This
quantity is sold at Pmr.  Rent is PowabPmw (the shaded portion of the graph).  Thus, relative to
the base case, quantity supplied to the market increases, resulting in a decrease in the market
price and in the rent accruing to consignees.45  It is worth noting that this analysis itself provides no basis for determining what proportion
of Qt is provided from the two sources (outside market vs. food aid), except in the
unambiguous case where Pow > Pmw.  In practice, the transactions costs of the two markets



















Figure B3. Open Economy Model with Infinitely Elastic Outside Supply
Implications are not fundamentally different from base case.  The official consignee price has
no effect on consumer prices unless it exceeds the willingness of consignees to pay for the
fixed quantity of food aid.  As the official price moves beyond this point, total quantity
supplied to the market falls and consumer prices increase.
III. Case 3: Infinite Outside Supply Elasticity
This is a special case of the previous one.  Quantity supplied to the market is further increased,
and consignee rents and retail prices are further reduced.  But rents are not eliminated unless
the exogenous willingness of consignees to pay is less than or equal to the official consignee
price (Pmw <= Pow).
The official consignee price has no effect on consumer prices under any circumstances.  If Pow
exceeds Pmw, no food aid is purchased, and the same total quantity is supplied to the market,
this time entirely from the outside market.
4545(...continued)
and government have an obvious incentive to dispose of all food aid, they will tend to provide



















Figure B4. Open Economy Monopoly Model
IV. Case 4: Monopoly with Open Economy
In this situation, depicted in Figure A4, a single consignee is granted access to all food aid, but
there exists an elastic source of outside supply for which market structure is competitive.  
Results and Implications:  If the quantity supplied of food aid is greater than the amount of
food aid the monopolist will accept (Sfa>Qmon): 
1. The monopolist would accept only Qmon, attempting to charge Pmon.  But competitive
traders accessing the alternative supply source (they have no access to the food aid)
would bring in quantity (Qt-Qmon), paying Pmw and selling at Pmr.  Thus, supply would
be increased (from Qmon to Qt) and price reduced (from Pmon to Pmr) from a simple
monopoly case.
2. The official consignee price Pow does affect the retail market price by affecting the
quantity of food aid the monopoly consignee is willing to accept.  The outside supply46  This is not to say they do not earn profits.  Recall that rents are defined as "excess" profits -
profit beyond what the consignee requires to stay in business.
84
reduces the retail price Pmr below what it would otherwise be, but the official price Pow
nevertheless has an effect.
Another way of expressing this is to say that the monopolist still influences price
(because he decides how much food aid to accept, based, of course, on Pow), but no
longer exactly determines it due to the presence of an alternative supply source.
If the quantity supplied of food aid is less than the amount the monopoly consignee will accept
(Sfa<Qmon), the consignee accepts all food aid and thereby loses control over the market price. 
This is now entirely determined by the quantity of food aid Sfa plus the quantity brought in by
competitive traders from the outside market.  We have returned to case two, where the official
consignee price Pow has no influence on market price, but where the market price is lower than
it would be in the absence of a market based outside supply source.
V.  Summary of Key Implications
As long as the quantity of food aid offered is less than what consignees will accept at the
official price, this price has no effect on retail prices.  This result holds whether there are
"many" or "few" consignees.  The consignees capture a rent, and the retail price is determined
entirely by the quantity placed on the market.  If the quantity of food aid exceeds what
consignees will accept at the fixed price, consignees do not accept all the grain being offered,
and they do not earn any rents.
46  In this case, the official price does affect the retail price,
through its effect on the quantity of food aid the consignees agree to purchase.  The clear
indicator that this has happened would be food aid supplies left in storage, or not accepted off
the boat by consignees.  This is what happened beginning in late 1992, with the very large
arrivals of commercial grain, and leakage of emergency grain onto the market.85
ANNEX C
DETRENDING ANALYSIS OF WHITE AND YELLOW MAIZE
GRAIN PRICES
NOTE: GMA = yellow maize grain
GMB = white maize grain
    REGRESSION OUTPUT:  GMA against time,        
        3/90 - 7/92                              
    Constant                   314.2069          
    Std Err of Y Est           95.31081          
    R Squared                   0.36178          
    No. of Observations              29          
    Degrees of Freedom               27          
    X Coefficient(s)  8.275862                   
    Std Err of Coef.  2.115408                   
    REGRESSION OUTPUT: GMB against time
        3/90 - 7/92
    Constant                   400.5172
    Std Err of Y Est           122.4915
    R Squared                  0.543045
    No. of Observations              29
    Degrees of Freedom               27
    X Coefficient(s)      15.4
    Std Err of Coef.  2.718679
    REGRESSION OUTPUT: GMB deviations from trend
      against GMA deviations from trend, 3/90-7/92
    Constant                   1.05E-15
    Std Err of Y Est           92.31191
    R Squared                  0.432058
    No. of Observations              29
    Degrees of Freedom               27
    X Coefficient(s)  0.844763
    Std Err of Coef.  0.186395
    t statistic:      4.53211986
Year Mth PY PW t TY TW DY DW
1990  3 342 400 1 322  416  20  -16 
4 294 384 2 331  431  -37  -47 
5 287 409 3 339  447  -52  -38 
6 376 504 4 347  462  29  42 
7 456 483 5 356  478  100  5 
8 369 526 6 364  493  5  33 
9 389 523 7 372  508  17  15 
10 433 563 8 380  524  53  39 
11 448 638 9 389  539  59  99 
12 476 702 10  397  555  79  147 
1991 1  407  570  11  405  570  2  0 
2 393 677 12  414  585  -21  92 
3 491 730 13  422  601  69  129 
4 417 500 14  430  616  -13  -116 
5 349 508 15  438  632  -89  -124 
6 327 561 16  447  647 -120  -86 
7 328 571 17  455  662 -127  -91 
8 373 472 18  463  678  -90  -206 
9 433 561 19  471  693  -38  -132 
10 575 747 20  480  709  95  38 
11 562 938 21  488  724  74  214 
12 343 823 22  496  739 -153  84 
1992 1  323  585  23  505  755  -182  -170 
2 395 618 24  513  770 -118  -152 
3 490 567 25  521  786  -31  -219 
4  729  806  26  529 801 200  5 
5  702  1022 27 538  816  164  206 
6 546 889 28  546  832  0  57 
7  659  1037 29 554  847  105  190 
8 574 1222  30 
9 467 1239  31 
10 507 1356  32 
11 626 1466  33 
12 458 1235  34 
1993 1  454  1717  35 
2 492 1452  36 
3 417 1059  37 
4 443 625 38 
5 431 596 39 
6 421 728 40 
Table C1. Data used in detrending analysis of white and yellow maize grain prices in
Maputo, March 1990 - July 199287
ANNEX D
NOTES ON THE ROLE OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL
MARKETS IN SUPPLYING MAIZE TO MOZAMBIQUE
In the past Mozambique has received food aid supplies and commercial maize products from
its neighbors, including Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Swaziland.  With peace and the
likely increase in export production and incomes, Mozambican traders will be in a better
position to expand participation in regional markets.  The major question to resolve is to what
extent those markets will be able to supply the Mozambican market and at what prices.  Maize
is a basic staple for the low income population and  maize supplies and prices are an important
determinant of welfare.  Knowledge of potential private sector activity contributes to the
ability of the Mozambican government and donors to develop assistance plans with a long
term development outlook.  The supply of white maize out of these neighboring countries may
also have important implications for the amount of commercial yellow maize food aid which
will be demanded at import parity prices.
This annex focuses on markets in Swaziland and South Africa, the major suppliers to the
southern region of Mozambique.
Maize markets in Swaziland
Informal imports from Swaziland have arrived in Mozambique throughout the war years, with
the road between Maputo and Manzini considered dangerous but passable.  The signing of the
peace accord has effectively opened the road to increased trade, although the relatively high
prices in Swaziland preclude an immediate increase in trade for maize products (see Chapter
Five, section III.D).  
Maize production in Swaziland is insufficient to meet the domestic market demand of 120,000
to 160,000 metric tons.  Production varies around 80,000 metric tons, leaving a gap of about
40-60 percent which is usually met with supplies from South Africa.  Maize marketing is
centralized in Swaziland, although about 70% of the domestic crop never enters the official
market.  It is not clear how much of this maize is marketed informally within Swaziland, or to
Mozambique.  SIMA researchers have observed Swazi white maize grain in Maputo markets,
but not in large quantities.  Within Swaziland, maize is often milled by hand or at small local
hammer mills for consumption at home or within the local area.  There is a government-set
pan-territorial, pan-seasonal price to producers, although wholesale and retail prices are not
controlled.  The government is virtually the sole purchaser of maize and so maintains the floor
price.  
The largest mill in the country, Swaki Mills, is owned by a private corporation.  In 1985, when
the owners threatened to close the mill, the government decided for food security reasons to
rent the mill, creating the National Milling Corporation (NMC) to manage it.  NMC is the
buyer of all maize purchased in the government channel (i.e., all officially marketed maize). 
The Swaki mill processes approximately 40,000 Mtons per year, with private commercial mills88
processing another 5,000 MTons.  As noted above, there are also small hammer mills
throughout the country, which combine with home processing for the majority of local maize
processing. 
The Central Cooperative Union (CCU) was established in 1971, but really began to expand
maize marketing operations in 1989 when it used government silos and sold grain to the
NMC.  The government has promoted development of the cooperatives to market more
smallholder production in the country and facilitate services to the smallholders.  Expansion of
marketed surplus within the country would mean less dependence on other markets for white
maize.  
The current pricing policy is based on concepts of import parity or opportunity costs rather
than production costs.  South African markets are viewed as the alternative source of supply
in determining opportunity costs.  If smallholders respond to the policy and produce surpluses,
it will be necessary to shift to an export parity pricing scheme, rather than import parity.  That
does not appear likely in the near future such that producer prices in Swaziland, currently at
37.35 Emalangeni per 70 kg sack (about $163 per ton) will remain above the Mozambican
producer prices, posted at 425 meticais per kg (approximately $100 per ton) (See Table 3 in
this document). 
There are additional constraints on the development of trade in maize products between
Swaziland and Mozambique.  Depending upon weather and productivity, about 50% of the
maize grain commercially milled in Swaziland comes from South Africa.  As a member of the
Customs Union, Swaziland is considered part of the South African domestic market and as
such receives maize grain for milling at the South African domestic price, currently Rand 545
per ton ($US 165 per ton) for mills.  Officially, Swaziland is not permitted to resell white
maize products outside the Customs Union because it relies on Customs Union supplies of the
grain.  De facto, when the price differential is high and Mozambican traders arrive to
purchase, exceptions to the rules are made and maize products cross the border.  For example,
during July of 1992, wholesale selling prices in Maputo (Basuca market) for white maize
meals was 53,000 meticais per 50 kg bag (about $16.50 at the parallel exchange rate, or $330
per ton) (MOA/MSU Research Team 1993 and USAID exchange rate series), high enough for
traders to justify the risks involved as well as the costs in Swaziland.
Even during the recent drought, when South Africa was rationing its white maize by a
compulsory mixing of white and yellow at mills, Swaki Mill received South African maize.  At
times of surplus white maize production, South Africa will sell as much white maize to Swaki
as is requested since the option of exporting the surplus to Japan or another market outside
the Union is less attractive.  The world market price for white maize is below the domestic
wholesale price (and sometimes below the final price received by farmers), such that the Maize
Board looks to markets within the Customs Union before attempting export sales.  
Mozambique has not joined the Customs Union, and there is no reason to expect that it will. 
This means that trade between Swaziland and Mozambique of white maize products will
remain informal and thus small in scale although potentially large in total volume, unless there89
are changes in the rules.  Since it is to the South African Maize Board's advantage to sell white
grain to Swaziland which is then sold as meal to Mozambique, either changing the policies or
looking the other way seem likely in times of surplus.  
Maize Markets in South Africa
In South Africa, a single channel policy has been used since 1987.  The Maize Board is
responsible for the marketing of all commercial maize grain in the country.  Smallholder
production of white maize is outside Maize Board control, averaging only 500,000 metric tons
annually out of a total white maize production of over 4 million tons.  Much smallholder
production is consumed on the farms, such that the sector generates only a small marketed
surplus.  Large commercial farmers are generally required to market through the Maize Board,
receiving a fixed, pan-seasonal and pan-territorial price.  There have been some recent
exemptions permitting commercial farmers to sell on the market directly.  Prices have
generally been based on concepts of import parity rather than export parity, resulting in
relatively high producer support prices. 
Millers purchase all their white maize grain from the Maize Board, which designates the
warehouses and silos from which the mills are authorized to obtain the grain.  Ostensibly, this
is to allocate supplies minimizing transport costs and decreasing producer price variability,
thereby keeping consumer prices low and producer prices stable.  It is important to note that
controls on millers' prices to wholesalers and retailers were eliminated in 1971, so that the only
official maize prices in the system are those of the Maize Board.
Pricing in South Africa under the single channel scheme is controversial.  Pan-territorial
pricing results in producers in areas near mills and urban areas subsidizing those in more
distant areas.  Most white maize production is in the Western Transvaal and Northern Free
State, distant from the main mills and consumption points.  The producer prices are generally
higher than export parity prices, resulting in losses for the Maize Board when excess supplies
are exported.  The real price in export markets has been at or below the Maize Board's
domestic selling price every year since 1980/81 (NAMPO, 1993).  
The Kassier Report (1992) has recommended market liberalization of the marketing system
for maize.  One caveat of the recommendation is that there should be protection against
dumping and imports with subsidies that keep the world market price low.  Setting producer
support prices based on export parity pricing will probably accelerate the recent decline in
maize production area.  
Policy changes under a new government in South Africa add another element of risk and
uncertainty.  A major function of the single channel maize policy is South African food
security based upon self-sufficiency of maize production.  The Maize Board maintains reserve
stocks of yellow and white maize and in 1991 increased the stocks from 900,000 metric tons
to 1,200,000 metric tons.  The recent drought renewed discussion of the importance of maize
stocks for food security, as almost 4 million metric tons of maize were imported to meet
demand.  Food security needs may become a focal point with a new government since maize is
a low income staple.  In discussions in South Africa, there appears to be no consensus on the
future of the Maize Board and the single-channel scheme with controlled maize grain prices.     47  In Swaziland, various people indicated that the unwillingness of Swazi consumers to eat
yellow maize was the association of yellow maize with scabies.  Apparently in the early 1980's,
yellow maize arrived at a time when a scabies epidemic occurred, leading to the perceived
link.  In Zimbabwe and South Africa, the preference is based on a perception that yellow
maize is appropriate animal feed while white maize is for human consumption.  In
Mozambique and possibly in South Africa, the texture of the grain and the resulting meals is
said to differ. White maize grain is a superior product for hand pounding.
48 Transport costs estimates given during a trip to South Africa in July 1993 ranged from a
low of 85 Rand per ton ($25.75) to as high as 100 Rand per ton ($30) by rail or truck from
(continued...)
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Issues in regional maize markets and potential for trade
The issue of consumer preferences becomes important in looking at the white maize markets
in the region.  While thorough studies have yet to be published concerning preferences, an
informal study conducted by the Maize Board in South Africa indicates that consumers are
willing to pay a 40-50% price premium to obtain white maize.  In Swaziland, white maize was
imported at a 70% price premium ($75 per ton over yellow maize at world prices) due to
consumer unwillingness to purchase yellow maize or the mixed yellow/white maize meal.  In
Zimbabwe, a study is currently underway to determine the degree of preference for white
maize, but it is thought to be high, as in South Africa.
47   In Mozambique, preferences appear
to be less strong, with consumers historically paying a market determined 30% price premium
for white maize.  Thus, with scarcity of white maize in the region, it is likely that prices in the
neighboring countries would go relatively higher for the white maize, while Mozambique
could use world markets for yellow maize to keep food prices down.
One of the basic problems with reliance upon regional white maize supplies is that of covariant
risks in production.  When there is a major drought in the region, supplies are scarce in all of
the countries in the region.  Production variability due to weather is high, resulting in extreme
fluctuations in South African production (NAMPO 1993) (See Table A2-1), similar to other
countries in the region.  The area planted to maize has declined gradually over the past twenty
years from about 4.1 million hectares in 1985/86 marketing year to 3.6 million hectares in
1992/93 (USDA/ERS production database, 1993).  As a result, supply availability of white
maize for export remains highly variable, ranging from none in 1983/84, 1984/85, and
1992/93, and as high as 2,500,000 metric tons in 1989/90.  The world market also evidences
high variability in supply.  It is unknown what effect the recent demand for white maize in
world markets will have on production in Argentina, the United States, and other countries. 
Unless there is a supply response, world white maize markets will remain thin. 
One of the blocks to increased regional trade is high transport costs.  This is also true for
domestic production in Mozambique, where production surpluses from the northern and
central regions are shipped to the maize-deficit south.  Lowering of domestic and interregional
transport costs would expand the potential for such trade.  Transport costs are a function of
volumes moved and small tonnage cargoes can cost up to and beyond $30 per ton from South
Africa to Maputo.
48  While the signing of the peace accord signed October 1992 has reduced48(...continued)
the Pretoria/Johannesburg area.  For comparison, freight is about $50 per ton from Gulf Ports
or Thailand for large ships, for a trip of 2 weeks or greater.
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transport risks and thereby lessened the costs, but without investments in port, rail, and road
infrastructure, the costs of trading will result in high marketing margins from production to
consumption regions.    
An additional hindrance to maize trade from any other country is the Mozambican imposition
of import duties and fees which sum to 17.5% of the value for maize products.  These duties
and fees represent substantial wedge between world prices and market prices in Mozambique. 
For a relatively low value commodity such as maize, this policy results in restricting the legal
maize transactions.  Various traders in Maputo cited the duties and fees as a major reason why
they dealt in rice and other commodities rather than maize.
Thus, high variance and covariance of production and marketed surplus of white maize within
the southern African region, high transport costs, and tariffs on official trade all limit the
usefulness of the world white maize market for Mozambique.  Supplies are likely to be most
scarce and high cost when Mozambique has greatest need.  When supplies are available, they
are likely to be inelastic.  The advantage that Mozambique has over its neighbors is greater
consumer acceptance of yellow maize, as long as the market is allowed to price it below white
maize.  This currently allows Mozambique to utilize food aid more effectively, and could in
the future (when foreign exchange is less limiting) allow it to utilize world yellow maize
markets to stabilize domestic maize prices.
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5 Production Exports Imports
White Yellow White Yellow White and Yellow White White White Yellow White and Yellow
1982/83 350  91 4200 4000  5096  89  1761.5  24.5  492  0 
1983/84 330  71 2100 2000  833  2389  32.3  50.3  881.1  22.9  252  0 
1984/85 350  215 1750 2800  712  2076  147.8  46.3  1223.8  24.2  0  269 
1985/86 400  403 3500 4200  1204  224  147.8  22.2 2842  118  285  0 
1986/87 459  111 3300 4300  3538  34  170  21.5 2278  110  495  0 
1987/88 271  132 3579 3489  2357  31  156  10  944  77  393  0 
1988/89 322  293 3780 2951  1390  57  100.3  27.5 2072  150  314  0 
1989/90 330  261 6553 4999  4909  3  111.7  32.1 1885  209  174  0 
1990/91 453  227 4365 3977  1784  0  135  16  1603.5  242.5  410  0 
1991/92 327  379 3810 4016  1393  369  153  10.8  1053.8  282.2  230  83 
1992/93 133  525 1232 1690  0  3950  45.6  127.3  372.6  144.4 
1993/94 533 4060  3974  84 
Notes:
1 Marketing years extend from April through March, beginning with the harvest period, except for South Africa which has a marketing year from May through April.
2 Work continues in Mozambique to improve estimates of production, consumption, and imports; these data should be taken as approximate at best.  They are taken from
several different data sources; see sources below.  Also note that in the past two years, the Early Warning Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture has developed new estimation
methods for production; thus, the most recent estimates are based upon a new methodology.   
3 Exports for South Africa include sales to Customs Union members: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia, as well as to the independent Black states.  During the
years 1983/84, 1984/5 and 1992/93, there were no exports outside the Customs Union.  South Africa exports and imports both white and yellow maize grain and products.
4 Export and Import data for 1982/83 through 1985/86 are approximations based on figures presented in the Maize Board Annual Report.
5 Swaziland production and import data does not distinguish between white and yellow maize, although most maize produced or imported in the country has been white. 
Source: Swaziland: Economic Planning Office, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (1993), Development Plan 1993/94 - 1995/96, Mbabane; and Early
Warning Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives database for 1992/93 data.  South Africa: Maize Board (1992), Maize Board Annual Report 1991/92;
Arcadia, Pretoria, and US Embassy unpublished data for 1992/93 - 1993/94.  Mozambique (1982/3 - 1989/90) FAO Agrostat 2.0 (1993) computer database, provisional
data.  Mozambique (1990/91 - 1992/3: Ministry of Commerce, DSA Bulletins, 1992/93.  Zimbabwe: Agritex/FAO Early Warning Unit, Ministry of Land, Agriculture, and
Water Development, Government of Zimbabwe, Harare for the production data 1985-1992, Commercial Farmers Union data files, Harare. for the yellow maize production
data, Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance, data files, Harare for the yellow maize production 1982-1985, and Grain Marketing Board, 1993, Annual Report 1992,
Harare for import and export data.93
ANNEX E
A STATIC CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCER PRICE
EFFECTS OF YELLOW MAIZE FOOD AID
I. INTRODUCTION
This annex presents a static conceptual analysis of the effects of yellow maize food aid on the
prices of white maize in Mozambique.  In each case, the country is divided into two regions. 
Region 1 produces white maize, while region 2 does not produce.  Region 2 is meant to
represent the major urban areas of the country.  Region 1 represents rural Mozambique.  
Region 1 may or may not export to region 2, depending on the level of outside supply of white
and yellow maize available to region 2.  The models consider two sources of supply from
outside: white maize imported commercially from Swaziland and Zimbabwe (the relevant
"world market" for Mozambique), and yellow maize donated as food aid and then sold
commercially.  White maize from Swaziland and Zimbabwe is considered to be identical to
that from rural Mozambique.  Yellow maize is modelled as a substitute.  We present two
cases, one in which supply from Swaziland and Zimbabwe is highly elastic, and one in which it
is quite inelastic relative to supply from rural Mozambique.  In each case, we assume an
increase in the amount of yellow maize food aid arriving in the urban region, which causes a
backwards shift in demand for white maize in this region.  We then examine the effect of this
change on prices, production, and consumption of white maize in rural and urban regions, on
exports of white maize from rural to urban Mozambique, and on imports of white maize from
the world market (Swaziland and Zimbabwe).  We show that the key determinants of the
effect of yellow maize food aid are the elasticity of supply in the world and domestic markets,
and the cross-price elasticity of demand between yellow and white maize.94
Figure E1. Effects of a demand shift on white maize prices within and outside Maputo95
In Figure E1, Scenario 1 has elastic world market supply.  Scenario 2 shows inelastic world
market supply.  Domestic supply and demand are identical in the two scenarios.  Each scenario
is depicted with three panels.  The far left panels contain the supply and demand schedules in
region 1, the rural producing region, and depict the effects of the yellow maize food aid on
total production and consumption in the rural area.  The far right panels contain the supply
and demand schedules for region 2, the urban non-producing region, and depict the effect of
increases in the volume of yellow maize food aid on total consumption in the urban area.  The
center panels contain supply schedules to the urban area from the world market and from the
rural area, along with total supply to the urban area (the sum of the first two supplies).  These
panels depict effects of the increased food aid on exports from the rural to the urban area, and
imports by the urban area from the world market.  Stated differently, they show the relative
effects of the yellow maize food aid on domestic white maize production and white maize
imports.
Notation is as follows:
S1 is the supply schedule in region 1, the producing region,
D1  is the demand schedule for region 1, 
D2  is the demand schedule for region 2, the urban region, prior to an increase in
the amount of food aid,
ES1 is the excess supply curve in region 1, 
ES1+M is the excess supply curve in region 1 plus a constant marketing margin
between region 1 and region 2; this represents supply in region 2 from region
1,
Sw is the world market (Swaziland and Zimbabwe) supply schedule, 
St is the total supply schedule to region 1, derived from the horizontal summation
of ES1+M and Sw, 
P1 is the market clearing price in region 1 prior to the increase in yellow maize
food aid, 
P2 is the market clearing price in region 2 prior to the food aid increase,
Q1x is the amount exported out of region 1 to region 2,
Q1c is consumption in region 1,
Q1t is production in region 1, 
Q2m is imports to region 2 from the world market, 
Q2t is consumption in region 2, and
* indicates after the arrival of food aid (for example, D
*
2 is the demand schedule
in region 2 after the arrival of food aid).
When supplies of white maize from Swaziland and Zimbabwe are highly elastic (Scenario 1),
an increase in the amount of yellow maize arriving in urban areas has a large negative impact
on the quantity of white maize consumed in the urban area, but most of this reduction is
absorbed by imports.  White maize production in rural Mozambique falls slightly and
consumption increases (both in response to a slightly lower price), so that exports from rural
to urban areas decrease.  Imports to the urban area from neighboring countries, however,
decrease more.  96
When white maize supply from the world market is inelastic (Scenario 2), the increased
amount of yellow maize food aid has a somewhat smaller effect on total white maize
consumption in region 2, but now domestic production and rural exports to urban areas
absorb nearly all the effect.  Both production and marketings from rural areas fall more than if
world market supply of white maize is elastic.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This analysis shows that the elasticity of supply of white maize from Swaziland and Zimbabwe
is a key determinant of the effects of yellow maize food aid on domestic white maize
production.  The less elastic is this supply, the greater is the negative effect on domestic
production of increased food aid arrivals.  Two other parameters are also important: the
elasticity of supply of white maize from rural Mozambique, and the cross-price elasticity of
demand between yellow and white maize.  A more elastic supply of white maize in rural
Mozambique will make domestic production more sensitive to increased food aid supplies of
yellow maize: a given price decrease will reduce domestic production more if domestic supply
is more elastic.  Finally, a strong cross-price elasticity of demand between yellow and white
maize will lead to a larger decrease in the demand for white maize in response to a yellow
maize food aid arrival.  As a result, domestic prices and production of white maize will be
more adversely affected by food aid.  If yellow and white maize are close substitutes in
consumption, they will have a relatively high cross-price elasticity of demand.  
Empirical assessment of the effects of yellow maize food aid on production of white maize in
Mozambique must assess current and likely future values of these three parameters: the
elasticity of supply out of Swaziland and Zimbabwe, the elasticity of domestic supply, and the
cross-price elasticity of demand (degree of substitutability) between yellow and white maize. 
It is especially important to assess the probable future evolution of these parameters, given the
rapid change taking place in the region.  The ending of the war in Mozambique has lead to
important changes in food marketing, and is expected to affect food production as well.  In
South Africa, the forthcoming political changes might bring important changes in economic
policy.
In addition to these parameters, a comprehensive assessment of the issue must evaluate the
performance of food markets in Mozambique in two key respects.  First, are spatially separate
food markets integrated through the flow of product in response to price incentives?  The
analysis in this annex assumed, for ease of exposition, that they are.  In fact, markets may be
more or less integrated, and the degree of integration will determine to what extent changes in
the urban price of white maize, induced by yellow maize food aid arrivals, are passed-on to
rural areas.  Second, are markets in a given geographical area well connected across levels in
the system?  In other words, will fluctuations in price at the retail or wholesale level be
transmitted to the producer level?  To the extent that they are not, producers will be insulated
from the potentially negative effects of food aid.  This is the issue of "price transmission".  
In Chapter Four, Section IV, we discuss these issues.  See also Annex D for a discussion of
price policy in Swaziland and South Africa.97
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